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INTEGRATION MATTERS: RETHINKING THE
ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
ANNA SPAIN*
ABSTRACT
International law promotes global peace and security by
providing mechanisms for the pacific settlement of international
disputes. This Article examines these mechanisms and their place
in the architecture of the international dispute resolution (“IDR”)
system. The Article identifies three core deficiencies of the IDR
system that limit its effectiveness and capacity.
First, the
international legal system has prioritized the development of
adjudication over other forms of dispute resolution; the
judicialization of international disputes and the proliferation of
courts and tribunals evidence this. However, adjudication is
limited in its capacity to resolve disputes that involve non-state
parties and extra-legal issues. This is concerning because empirical
studies show that international conflict is increasingly intra-state,
and involves non-state actors and extra-legal issues. Second, states
prefer mediation to adjudication as a method for resolving
disputes that occur in the context of inter-state conflict. Yet the
role and value of mediation have been underappreciated, and it
lacks institutional support under international law. Third, the
current architecture of the IDR system promotes single method
approaches, which can foster fragmented IDR approaches that
separate legal issues from extra-legal ones, despite their
interconnected nature. It also fails to structurally incorporate
emerging, hybrid IDR approaches that enhance IDR capacity. In
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response to these limitations, this Article argues that there is a need
to restructure the IDR system to create a framework for
understanding how to systematically integrate IDR methods across
forums. The Article concludes by considering several challenges
that this approach presents to the state-centric foundations of the
international legal system.
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INTRODUCTION

For much of its history, international law has served to
promote peace and security by providing for the pacific resolution
of disputes between nations.1 Traditionally, this aim has been
1 See generally U.N. Charter pmbl., para. 1 (noting peace and international
security as a common goal of participating states); U.N. Charter art. 2 (“All
Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means . . . .”); U.N.
Charter art. 33, para. 1 (mandating that parties to a dispute first seek a resolution
through peaceful means).
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served through the establishment of courts and tribunals set up for
the purpose of settling legal disputes. However, the evolving
nature of conflict is changing the character of international dispute
resolution. Today’s conflicts are increasingly intra-state and
involve non-state actors and extra-legal issues. In response,
dispute resolution methods and the institutions that provide them
have evolved and multiplied. Innovative dispute resolution
mechanisms that extend beyond traditional legal forms into
political and social dimensions have emerged.2 Despite the
benefits of these approaches, they have been met with resistance by
international law traditionalists who hold fundamentally different
views about the purpose and role of dispute resolution under
international law.3
Furthermore, while the growth and
diversification of international dispute resolution has provided
many benefits, it has also led to the lack of a coherent and effective
system.
This Article critiques the architecture of the existing IDR4
system and argues that it should be restructured to provide a
framework for integrating different dispute resolution methods
and the institutions that provide them. It also explores some
important questions about the relationship between the
international legal system and the system of international dispute
resolution and how one both influences and is influenced by the
other. The central question, to borrow from James Crawford, is
“can the superstructure change the foundations?”5 This Article
examines how the foundations of international law impact the
structure of the IDR system in ways that limit its efficacy and

See generally JACOB BERCOVITCH & RICHARD JACKSON, CONFLICT RESOLUTION
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES, METHODS, AND APPROACHES (2009)
(discussing new methods for the resolution or management of international
conflicts).
3 See generally ROSALYN HIGGINS, Policy Considerations and the International
Judicial Process, reprinted in THEMES AND THEORIES: SELECTED ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND
WRITINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19, 19–43 (2009) (discussing the tensions between
different viewpoints over legal and political aspects of the international judicial
process).
4 For purposes of this Article, International Dispute Resolution is defined as
methods used for assessing, preventing, managing, or resolving inter-state or
other international disputes and conflicts. This Article primarily considers the
following forms of third-party IDR: adjudication (judicial settlement and
arbitration), mediation and conciliation.
5 JAMES CRAWFORD, International Law as an Open System, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS AN OPEN SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS 17, 18 (2002).
2
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capacity. The Article then extends this analysis to consider how
international dispute resolution—through new approaches—is also
affecting the foundations of international law.
There are three central deficiencies with the current IDR
system. First, international law prioritizes the use of adjudication,
which is limited in its capacity to provide effective dispute
resolution. Although the U.N. Charter provides for a variety of
IDR methods,6 the international legal system has primarily
advanced the institutionalization of regimes that support
arbitration and judicial settlement. The recent proliferation of
courts and tribunals and the judicialization of dispute resolution,
particularly in the areas of trade, investment, and commercial
disputes, illustrate this development.7
At once, the primacy of adjudication makes sense, given that
state sovereignty is foundational to international law. The basis for
authority in adjudication reinforces this state-centric view. For
states, adjudication offers a dispute resolution process that
promises familiarity, enjoys enforcement mechanisms, and clarifies
rules for future behavior.8 However, the primacy of adjudication is
misplaced because it is limited in its capacity to resolve disputes
that involve non-state parties and extra-legal issues. Judicial
settlement before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), for

6 See U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1 (”The parties to any dispute, the
continuance which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”).
7 See Philippe Sands, Introduction to RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., THE MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, at ix, xi–xiii (2d ed. 2010) (describing the
proliferation of international adjudicatory bodies as evidence of the growing trend
toward third-party adjudication of international disputes); Cesare P. R. Romano,
The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International
Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791, 792–
95 (2007) (discussing the shift toward compelling disputants to consent to the
jurisdiction of an international adjudicative body). See generally Andrea Kupfer
Schneider, Not Quite a World Without Trials: Why International Dispute Resolution is
Increasingly Judicialized, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 119 (2006) (discussing the increase in
the use of trials to resolve international legal disputes).
8 See Richard B. Bilder, Adjudication: International Arbitral Tribunals and Courts,
in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS & TECHNIQUES 155, 174 (I.
William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997) (discussing the benefits and
advantages of adjudication).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/1

SPAIN.DOC

2010]

11/23/2010 3:49 PM

RETHINKING INT’L DISPUTE RESOLUTION

5

instance, is only available to states for contentious cases and to
states and U.N. organs for advisory opinions.9
This is a problem in light of empirical studies that show that
the nature of conflict is changing. During the 19th and 20th
centuries, the main form of international conflict10 was inter-state.11
At that time, it made sense to emphasize state-centric IDR practices
because resolving disputes between nations minimized the need
for them to send their militaries to war.12 However, since World
War II (“WWII”), the number of inter-state armed conflicts has
decreased, while the number of intra-state armed conflicts has
increased.13 Non-state armed conflict, occurring between two or
more non-state organized armed groups, has emerged as well.14
Thus, the nature of international conflict in the 21st century
increasingly involves non-state actors and complex extra-legal
disputes. These changes suggest that an effective IDR system
requires the capacity to: (1) provide for the full participation of
non-state actors; and (2) address the full-spectrum of issues in a
dispute.
9 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, para. 1, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055 (stating that “[o]nly states may be parties in cases before the Court”);
id. art. 65, para. 1 (stating that the court may give an opinion to a legal question
presented by any body authorized by Charter of the United Nations); see also How
the Court Works, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/court
/index.php?p1=1&p2=6 (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (discussing how the
International Court of Justice entertains contentious cases and advisory
proceedings).
10 See discussion infra Part 2 (providing a detailed explanation of
international conflict, but referring generally to inter-state armed conflicts and
intra-state, non-state, or other forms of armed conflict that become
internationalized by presenting a threat to global peace and security).
11 See MEREDITH REID SARKEES & FRANK WHELON WAYMAN, RESORT TO WAR
1816–2007, at 562–65 (2010) (providing an empirical study of the onset of wars by
type over time); see also ROBERT A. HINDE, BENDING THE RULES: MORALITY IN THE
MODERN WORLD—FROM RELATIONSHIPS TO POLITICS AND WAR 199–224 (2007)
(providing a historical account of inter-state wars from an ethics-based
perspective).
12 This Article acknowledges the definitional distinctions between these two
terms and defines conflict as an ongoing multi-issue event that results in violence
or the loss of life whereas a dispute is a nonviolent specific matter, by subject or
time, or both. However, there are cases that can be classified as both a dispute
and a conflict where the terms are used interchangeably. See BERCOVITCH &
JACKSON, supra note 2, at 19–20 (providing a broad definition of the term
“conflict”).
13 See SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 11, at 562 (stating that intra-state wars
began to rise by the mid-1960s).
14 See id. at 70 (defining and describing non-state war).
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Second, the international legal community has not given
adequate attention to the role or value of non-judicial IDR
methods.
Two empirical studies on international conflict
management suggest that states prefer mediation to adjudication
for resolving disputes that arise in the context of armed inter-state
conflict.15 This might seem counterintuitive given the growth of
adjudication capacity and use, but there are several explanations
for this. Mediation allows states to maintain control over the
process and provides other benefits that adjudication does not.16
However, the precise use and value of mediation in the
international context is not well developed in international legal
scholarship.
Furthermore, mediation lacks the necessary
institutional capacity to adequately respond to the volume and
array of international disputes.
Third, the architecture of the IDR system is structured in a
manner that promotes the use of single method approaches and
fosters institutional fragmentation.
International dispute
resolution is commonly described as a menu of single method
approaches (negotiation, adjudication, mediation, conciliation, and
inquiry), defined according to classifications (binding/nonbinding,
and legal/diplomatic).17 This description presents IDR as a set of

15 See
JACOB BERCOVITCH & JUDITH FRETTER, REGIONAL GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND MANAGEMENT FROM 1945 TO 2003, at 29 fig.2 (2004)
(surveying the choice of conflict management approaches for 343 international
conflicts and finding that states used mediation in 59.3% of all cases, negotiation
in 32.2%, and arbitration in 0.6%).
16 See id. at 29 (arguing that mediation is frequently used because it has a high
chance of success and permits states to retain some control over the process). See
also Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is There Method in the Madness of
Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation, 32 INT’L
INTERACTIONS 329, 331–33 (2006) (studying factors that impact the effectiveness of
mediation in resolving international disputes); Derrick V. Frazier & William J.
Dixon, Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946–2000, 32 INT’L
INTERACTIONS 385, 395 tbl.3 (2006) (measuring the frequency of use of various
mediation techniques in an attempt to assess their effectiveness in resolving
international disputes).
17 For examples of scholarly works that assess the application of adjudication,
mediation, and other IDR methods as applied in international disputes, see
generally JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES (1999) (providing a broad
overview of the main processes of IDR); RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., THE MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2d ed. 2010) (tracing the development of
international courts and tribunals); J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT (4th ed. 2005) (offering a comprehensive overview of international
dispute resolution, including the relevant techniques and institutions involved).
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fragmented processes that separate legal issues from extra-legal
ones, despite their interconnected nature. It also fails to recognize
emerging hybrid approaches and their place in the system. As case
studies and a review of IDR institutions demonstrate, these hybrid
approaches—defined as multiple (the use of two or more IDR
methods applied sequentially) and mixed (integrating aspects of
different methods into a single process)—offer important
contributions that should be recognized. For example, in the ICJ
Frontier Dispute case, the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso
reached a cease-fire and worked to resolve their underlying
disputes through judicial settlement by the ICJ and a mediationlike process that involved local stakeholders.18 This combination of
rights-based and interest-based methods brought an end to the
armed conflict and the ongoing disputes.
In response to these limitations, this Article argues that there is
a need to restructure the IDR system to create a framework for
understanding how to systematically integrate IDR methods across
forums. Doing so provides an accurate descriptive account of the
system’s capacity for dispute resolution. It also enhances IDR by
identifying how to integrate methods and institutions in a manner
that promotes a coherent and effective system.
However,
rethinking international dispute resolution as an integrated system
challenges the state-centric foundations of the international legal
system and raises questions about who the system seeks to serve.
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part 2 provides
definitional and historical context for international dispute
resolution and its role in promoting global peace and security. Part
3 presents three areas of deficiency in the IDR system: prioritizing
adjudication, overlooking mediation, and structural fragmentation.
Part 4 explores the use of hybrid approaches—multiple methods
and mixed methods—in international dispute resolution, and
examines their unique contributions to IDR capacity. Part 5
explains why it is important to restructure the architecture of the
IDR system to promote the integration of methods and institutions.
Part 6 considers how conceiving of international dispute resolution
in this manner affects traditional notions concerning the purpose
and scope of international law.

18

Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
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THE ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Promoting global peace and security has long been a
fundamental purpose of international law.
The modern
international community of states operationalized this purpose in
the United Nations Charter in the wake of WWII.19 Article 33 of
the U.N. Charter requires that “[t]he parties to any dispute, the
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or
other peaceful means of their own choice.”20 Putting this principle
into practice has required institutionalizing IDR by developing and
promoting norms, creating methods, and establishing capacity
through institutions. These methods, along with their theories and
practices, have evolved into a regime of “decision-making
procedures”21 that, beyond preventing conflict, also provide the
international community with a venue for solving collective
problems.22 This Part provides a historical overview of the main
methods of international dispute resolution in order to offer
necessary definitions and context for the Article.23

19 See U.N. Charter art. 33, paras. 1–2 (urging member nations to seek
peaceful resolutions to international disputes); see also id. art. 2, para. 4 (calling for
nations to refrain from the threat or use of force).
20 Id. art. 33, para. 1.
21 See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes
as Intervening Variables, 36 INT’L ORG. 185, 185 (1982) (offering a comprehensive
discussion of international regimes and the influence that changes in structure,
norms, and decision-making can have on them).
22 See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982)
(providing substantive information regarding the complexities of negotiation and
mediation).
23 Note that the methods covered are referred to collectively as alternative
dispute resolution (“ADR”) in the United States, Great Britain, and other
countries. This term refers to practices evolving out of the search for alternatives
to litigation in municipal courts. For more information regarding the origins of
ADR in the United States, see generally LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the role of lawyers in
preventing and resolving conflicts); Frank E. A. Sander, Professor of Law,
Harvard Univ., Varieties of Dispute Processing (Apr. 8, 1976), in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R.
Wheeler eds., 1979) (advocating for the use of alternative methods in dispute
resolution, such as arbitration and mediation).
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IDR methods have traditionally been grouped by type
(diplomatic, legal, political), aim (prevention, management,
resolution), and enforcement status (binding or nonbinding).24
Negotiation is often the first IDR method employed in a dispute.
Defined as direct communication between disputing parties for the
purpose of reaching agreements that will settle or resolve a
dispute, the practice of negotiation is historically pervasive.25
Negotiation is commonly categorized as a diplomatic form of IDR.
The forms of IDR considered in this Article are third-party
approaches. Legal methods involve the settlement of a dispute
through a decision based on a rule that is binding on the parties.26
Adjudication is a legal method that is fundamentally a rights-based
process administered through judicial settlement or arbitration that
addresses claims composed of grievances over an injury coupled
with an expectation of redress.27 Traditionally, state use of
arbitration occurred through ad hoc bodies.28 At the Hague Peace
Conference of 1899, 28 states adopted the Convention for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes in order to “insure the
pacific settlement of international differences.”29
They
institutionalized this principle with the establishment of The
Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”).30 The Convention
24 See COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 17, at 19–41 (discussing methods of
settlement in international disputes).
25 See BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 19–31 (discussing the basic
principles and frameworks for international negotiation); MERRILLS, supra note 17,
at 1–2 (discussing negotiation in international disputes).
26 See BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 47–48 (discussing international
arbitration and judicial settlement in binding third parties to a proposed
resolution); MERRILLS, supra note 17, at 91 (discussing arbitration in international
disputes).
27 See Richard B. Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an International
Dispute Settlement Technique, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (1982) (questioning how
international disputes arise and the appropriateness of adjudication as a means of
dispute resolution).
28 See DANIEL TERRIS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES 1–4 (2007) (providing a
historical account of the development of international arbitration); see also Sands,
supra note 7, at x–xi (describing four phases of the development of international
adjudication).
29 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, art. 1, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779; see Sands, supra note 7, at ix (noting that the Convention
“marked a turning point in favour of international adjudication before standing
bodies”).
30 See TERRIS ET AL., supra note 28, at 2–3 (describing the creation of the PCA
and the structure of the PCA).
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organized the PCA as a locus for international adjudication to
ensure that these nations had alternatives to war.31 The PCA was
empowered with the ability to conduct arbitration, conciliation and
fact-finding. After World War II, the importance of having a
standing body with permanent judges led to a shift toward judicial
settlement through the ICJ.32 Thus, international adjudication was
institutionalized through the creation of two prominent forums
offering distinct but related methods. The purpose of creating
these institutions was, in part, to enhance effective dispute
settlement between nations in order to reduce the probability that
they would resort to war as a means for settling differences. Since
then, international courts and tribunals have proliferated in
number and variety.33 The International Criminal Court (“ICC”)
and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”) are
two recent examples. Additional examples will be discussed in
Part 3.
Non-judicial forms of third-party IDR include mediation,
conciliation, and fact-finding/inquiry. Mediation is a form of
third-party intervention by which an unbiased party convenes
disputing parties, facilitates a process for communicating positions
and underlying interests, and promotes agreement formation.34
Mediation outcomes, absent other arrangements, are nonbinding.
Mediation provides “direct positive contributions” such as agenda
setting and problem solving and “weakens constraints on the
primary parties.”35 One benefit of mediation in the international
context is its inclusive and cross-cultural approach to problem

31 See Sands, supra note 7, at ix (describing the formation of the PCA as the
first standing body for international adjudication).
32 See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 17, at 4–5 (discussing the formation and
organizational structure of the ICJ).
33 See Sands, supra note 7, at ix (discussing a comprehensive treatment of
international courts and tribunals); see also CESARE P.R. ROMANO & THE PROJECT ON
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY IN CONTEXT: A SYNOPTIC
CHART, available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart/synop
_c4.pdf (providing a graphic and textual overview of the expansion of
international courts, tribunals, and other judicial bodies).
34 See BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 32–46 (defining and discussing
mediation as a method of international dispute resolution); MERRILLS, supra note
17, at 28–44 (discussing the use and structure of mediation in international
disputes).
35 MICHAEL BRECHER & JONATHAN WILKENFELD, A STUDY OF CRISIS 185 (2000).
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solving.36 Mediation emerged as a field of scholarly study in the
1980s, influenced by the rise of the practice of mediation as an
alternative to litigation.37
Conciliation operates by having an institutionalized thirdparty, usually a commission, provide an impartial examination of
the dispute and suggest settlement terms.38 The process is
nonbinding. The first documented adoption of conciliation in an
inter-state context occurred in a 1920 treaty between Sweden and
Chile and, since then, it has been included as a dispute resolution
option in numerous treaties.39 Dispute resolution bodies have
codified procedural rules, such as the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law’s (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on
International Commercial Conciliation, which uses the terms
“mediation” and “conciliation” interchangeably.40 However, the
use of conciliation is minimal, which is explained by its inherent
restrictions, including limited subject matter and the expense of
setting up a commission.41
Fact-finding and inquiry are two processes often combined to
develop an impartial account of the facts of a particular case in
order to establish a foundation for negotiations, mediation, or
another process.42 The practice of inquiry varies widely from true

36 See NADJA ALEXANDER, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE MEDIATION:
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 48 (2009) (discussing how mediation is a flexible process with
potential to accommodate a cross-cultural approach).
37 See Louis Kriesberg, The Development of the Conflict Resolution Field, in
PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS & TECHNIQUES 51, 51–63 (I.
William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997) (providing a comprehensive
overview of the development of conflict resolution from 1914–1995).
38 See MERRILLS, supra note 17, at 64 (discussing the method and history of the
process of conciliation).
39 See id. at 64–67 (noting the adoption of conciliation by the Belgian-Danish
Commission, the East African Community, and the Chaco Commission, among
others).
40 See U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE L., MODEL LAW ON CONCILIATION WITH
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND USE, at 1, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.4 (2002) (noting the
definitions of “conciliation” and “mediation” as interchangeable).
41 See MERRILLS, supra note 17, at 87–88 (discussing the reasons for the
infrequent use of conciliation, which including the restrictive nature of treaty
obligations and the expense of convening and operating a commission); see also
BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, supra note 15, at 25 (arguing that conciliation may be
inappropriate for minor conflicts because it is too elaborate, but similarly may be
insufficient for major conflicts because it is void of political authority).
42 See MERRILLS, supra note 17, at 45–46 (noting the use of inquiry in resolving
a disputed issue of fact).
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fact-finding to activities that mirror arbitration.43 Other forms of
third-party IDR include peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention,
and peacebuilding.44 Although these forms are outside the scope
of this Article, they are important methods worthy of further study
and analysis.45 Together, these methods, along with the variety of
institutions and venues that provide them, make up the IDR
system.
In addition to creating rules and institutions, international law
has proliferated norms that advance the use of dispute resolution
mechanisms. The ILC’s Report on State Responsibility promotes
the use of dispute resolution mechanisms for addressing wrongful
acts by one nation against another.46 In the transnational arena,
parties have developed specialized dispute resolution services to
help manage differences.47 In the treaty-making realm, nations
proactively include provisions governing dispute settlement in
agreements,48 which have been repeatedly noted in U.N. General
See id. at 59–61 (discussing the valuable and varied methods of inquiry).
See BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 76–168 (noting general
strategies to peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and peacebuilding).
45 See id. (discussing a comprehensive review of the definitions and use of
these IDR methods).
46 See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53rd sess, Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10,
2001, at 294, art. 42, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR 56th sess., Supp. No. 10 (Dec. 12,
2001), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5610.pdf
(discussing the benefits of a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism); see also
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 48th sess., May 6-July 26, 1996, at 64–65, arts. 54–60,
U.N. Doc. A/51/10; GAOR 51st sess., Supp. No. 10 (1996), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/english/A_51_10.pdf
(governing
the
settlement of international disputes through negotiation, conciliation, and
arbitration).
47 See
generally MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, ORDERING PLURALISM: A
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL WORLD
(Naomi Norberg trans., 2009) (exploring ways to counter transnational pluralism
and other problems associated with the increasing interconnectedness of national
economies and institutions).
48 See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art.
14, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, amended by Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 19,
opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force Feb. 16,
2005) (“In the event of a dispute between any two or more Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention, the Parties concerned shall seek a
settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their
own choice.”); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 187–88, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (setting forth the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes
Chamber); Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter arts. 10–11, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S.
120 (governing the development of “procedures for the assessment of liability and
43
44
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Assembly Resolutions.49 IDR provisions in treaties have become so
commonplace that some states have argued against their inclusion
in treaties on the grounds that the international legal requirement
is of such an obvious nature it does not require restatement.50
3.

DEFICIENCIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
SYSTEM

This Part argues that the existing IDR system suffers from three
critical limitations that affect its effectiveness and capacity. First,
the system emphasizes adjudication, which is not well suited to
resolve disputes involving non-state actors or extra-legal issues.
Second, it overlooks the value and institutional development of
mediation, despite states’ preference for mediation in certain
contexts. Third, the architecture of the IDR system fails to offer a
framework for understanding how to integrate methods and
consequently fosters institutional fragmentation.
3.1. The Primacy of Adjudication
Adjudication is generally recognized as the central form of
dispute resolution under international law.51 Its primary use has
been to settle inter-state claims over areas of disputed territory,
state responsibility, trade, investment, and more recently, the
environment, human rights, and international crimes arising from
armed conflict. The focus on developing adjudication has emerged
in two ways. First, institutions that provide adjudication have
the settlement of disputes regarding dumping”); see also Dominique Alheritiere,
Settlement of Public International Disputes on Shared Resources: Elements of a
Comparative Study of International Instruments, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 701, 703–05
(1985) (discussing various international conventions that include provisions
governing the pacific settlement of disputes).
49 See Alheritiere, supra note 48, at 704–05 (describing the General Assembly’s
repeated decisions to “take note” of the United Nations Environment
Programme’s draft principles on resource dispute settlement, which included a
provision urging member nations to seek peaceful resolutions of disputes).
50 See id. (noting several nation’s objections to the inclusion of a provision
urging the pacific settlement of disputes in the United Nations Environmental
Programme’s draft principles on resource dispute settlement, on the grounds that
the repetition of such an “obvious and . . . accepted” premise of international law
would only serve to weaken it).
51 See generally Sands, supra note 7, at ix–xviii (discussing the emergence of
adjudication as the primary form of IDR, the rise of international adjudicatory
bodies, the increasing roles of non-state actors in international disputes, and the
corresponding increase in international litigation).
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proliferated in recent years. In addition to the ICJ and PCA,
standing forums presently include the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, The World Trade Organization’s
Dispute Settlement Body (“WTO DSB”), and the International
Criminal Court. Additionally, the creation of treaty-based forums
has become more pervasive.52 Second, scholars claim that there is a
trend toward compulsory jurisdiction and binding decisionmaking in international adjudicatory forums.53 The normalization
of adjudication suggests that “disputes are more likely than ever to
be resolved through a trial or adjudicatory method.”54
States use adjudication because it offers certainty of process
and a binding outcome that enjoys the promise of compliance
under international law.55 International courts assist states in
developing a common understanding of facts and law that
promotes dispute resolution by clarifying substantive rules of
law.56 Adjudication also extends the state-centric foundations of
international law by treating states as the primary actors with
authority to allow for the participation of non-state actors.
However, from the perspective of enhancing capacity to
resolve international disputes, there is a compelling argument
against solely emphasizing adjudication above other forms of IDR.
52 See id. at xiii (noting the trend toward inclusion of binding dispute
resolution methods in treaties, e.g. the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea and the 1994 World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding).
53 See Romano, supra note 7, at 803–16 (discussing the shift in international
adjudication from consensual jurisdiction and the option clause to the rise of
compulsory jurisdiction).
54 Andrea K. Schneider, Bargaining in the Shadow of (International) Law: What
the Normalization of Adjudication in International Governance Regimes Means for
Dispute Resolution, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 789, 793 (2009). See also Susan D.
Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 161, 201 (2007) (“The prevalence of arbitration provisions and the apparent
structural inclination towards arbitration indicate a presumption that arbitration
is the ‘best’ mechanism for resolving treaty disputes.”) (footnote omitted);
Christopher Shen, International Arbitration and Enforcement in China: Historical
Perspectives and Current Trends, 14 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 69, 70 (2005)
(characterizing arbitration as the “preferred method of international dispute
resolution”).
55 See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed.
1979) (discussing the complex relationship between nations and international law
and finding that most states obey most international law most of the time).
56 See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY 51–53 (2008) (discussing the role that international courts play as
an “information mechanism”).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/1

SPAIN.DOC

2010]

11/23/2010 3:49 PM

RETHINKING INT’L DISPUTE RESOLUTION

15

The nature of international disputes is changing in ways that
require approaches to dispute resolution not offered by
adjudication. Empirical studies on the onset of wars over time
indicate that inter-state armed conflict is declining, while intrastate cases are increasing. The first study was conducted by the
Correlates of War (“COW”) Project, founded by J. David Singer in
1936. This study categorized armed conflicts resulting in at least
1000 deaths57 and defined them as either inter-state, extra-state,
civil, or—more recently—intra-state and non-state conflicts.58 The
2010 COW study identified 655 wars between 1816 and 2007, and
found a general constancy in the incidence of war onsets overall.59
However, the data suggests that intra-state wars are a growing
percentage of the whole since WWII. Regionally, Asia, Africa, and
the Western Hemisphere are the most war-prone regions, followed
by the Middle East, Europe, and Oceania.60 An earlier 2003 COW
study of 401 wars between 1816 and 1997 found a “negative
correlation between extra-state and intra-state war onsets.”61 The
University of Maryland’s Peace and Conflict 2010 report by Hewitt,
Wilkenfeld, and Gurr found a similar trend, and noted that intrastate conflict is rising.62 A third study of 121 conflicts between 1989

SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 11, at 6.
See id. (defining inter-state conflicts as armed conflicts between “States or
members of the interstate system”; extra-state conflicts as armed conflicts between
a state and a non-state entity outside of the state’s borders; and civil conflicts as
conflicts between the government of a state and other groups within that state’s
borders); id. at 337 (“[I]ntra-state war involves sustain combat between or among
organized armed forces that takes place within the territorial boundaries of a state
system member . . . .”); id. at 485 (defining non-state wars, which consists of two
distinct classifications: “wars between . . . nonstate entities that take place in
nonstate territory . . . and wars between [nonstate armed groups] that take place
across state borders”). The definition of “intra-state” conflict has evolved, and
now refers to conflicts taking place within a state’s territory, including—but not
limited to—civil wars and, most recently, conflicts between or among non-state
entities.
59 Id. at 562.
60 Id. at 566 fig.7.6.
61 Id. at 562.
62 See J. Joseph Hewitt, Trends in Global Conflict, 1946–2007, in PEACE AND
CONFLICT 2010 27, 27 (J. Joseph Hewitt et al. eds., 2010) (graphically demonstrating
the negative correlation between extra-state and intra-state war onsets and noting
that “[a]t the beginning of 2008 . . . [all armed conflicts worldwide] were civil
conflicts between the government of a state, on the one hand, and at least one
internal group on the other”).
57
58

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

SPAIN.DOC

16

11/23/2010 3:49 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 32:1

and 2005 identified 90 as intra-state and seven as inter-state.63 In
2005, all 31 ongoing conflicts were intra-state, with six of them
internationalized (indicating the presence of a second state’s armed
forces).64 As of early 2008, there were 26 active armed conflicts in
the world and all were classified as intra-state, occurring between a
government and one or more internal groups.65
These studies suggest that intra-state conflicts are on the rise
while onsets of inter-state conflict are declining. This is significant
because adjudication is primarily designed to serve state actors.
Most adjudicatory forums lack jurisdiction over non-state actors
that are important stakeholders in such disputes.66 Stakeholders
that lack standing or that fall outside of the forum’s jurisdiction can
be excluded from the process.67 Non-state actors have no recourse
to bring a claim before the ICJ in contentious cases and only U.N.
organs and agencies may seek recourse from the ICJ in the form of
advisory opinions. While the PCA permits cases involving statecontrolled entities or international organizations, the second party
must be a state.68 Adjudicatory bodies that derive jurisdiction
through treaties are typically limited to states that have become
subject to the treaty. Without the capacity to increase non-state
actor participation in adjudicatory proceedings, this form of IDR is
not well equipped to resolve disputes that arise in the context of
intra-state conflict and, given the data, this is an emerging
problem.
A second limitation is that adjudication is not designed to
address extra-legal issues.
Its limited justiciability makes
adjudication poorly equipped to resolve complex, multi-issue
disputes involving political, social, environmental, and ethical

63 Lotta Harbom et al., Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements, 43 J. PEACE RES.
617, 618 tbl.2 (2006).
64 Id.
65 Hewitt, supra note 62, at 27.
66 See Rosalyn Higgins, The ICJ, the ECJ, and the Integrity of International Law,
52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 12 (2003) (describing both the increasing importance of
non-state entities in today’s global arena and the lack of legal jurisdiction over
these entities).
67 See, e.g., PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT
252–53 (3d ed. 2009) (showing that judicial proceedings and arbitration tend not to
cater to the multilateral nature of certain environmental issues).
68 See Rules of Procedure, PERM. COURT OF ARBITRATION, http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1188 (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (listing the
Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Optional Rules for Arbitration).
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interests.69 Often a court will issue an opinion that fails to resolve
key issues in the case. For example, despite the ICJ’s decision
regarding Slovakia and Hungary’s dispute over a project to build
barrages in the Danube River,70 the matter remains unresolved.71
In the Nuclear Tests cases, and other cases,72 the ICJ was heavily
criticized for leaving the question of legality of nuclear testing, a
politicized matter, undecided, and for failing to identify legal
principles upon which environmental protection could be based.73

69 See R. P. ANAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1969)
(discussing the challenges and limitations of adjudication in various international
contexts, including the fact that the ICJ is “hedged in by the sacrosanct limits of
consent and curbed by the absence of any execution machinery”); Richard B.
Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an International Dispute Settlement
Technique, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1982) (explaining the potential inability of a legal
judgment to address the underlying primary, often unrelated, issues which
prompted the legal matter); J. G. Merrills, The Role and Limits of International
Adjudication, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 169, 169-82
(William E. Butler ed., 1987) (exploring the justiciability of international disputes
and specifically, the question “why adjudication as a process is capable of dealing
with some disputes and not with others”); G. Shinkaretskaya, The Present and
Future Role of International Adjudication as a Means for Peacefully Settling Disputes, 29
INDIAN J. INT’L L. 87, 88 (1989) (suggesting that an international court cannot play a
role in avoiding armed conflict because the court has “no powers to act
independently and possess[es] very limited opportunities for influencing the
political conduct of States Parties to a dispute”).
70 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
71 See Salman M.A. Salman, Good Offices and Mediation and International Water
Disputes, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 155, 162–64 (The Int’l
Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2002) (pointing out that, despite
adjudication, the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros dispute and many other water disputes
remain unresolved).
72 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 266 (July 8) (deciding “[t]here is in neither customary nor conventional
international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons” but not reaching the issue of nuclear testing); Certain Phosphate Lands
in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 240
(June 26) (avoiding ruling upon the substantive legal issues before the court);
Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20) (declining to
rule upon the illegality of atmospheric nuclear weapon testing); see also Press
Release, Int’l Court of Justice, New Zealand’s Request for an Examination of the
Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s 1974 Judgment in the
Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) I.C.J. Press Release 95/29 (Sept. 22,
1995) (denying New Zealand’s request for special procedure filed subsequent to
the Nuclear Tests Case decision).
73 See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20)
(declining to rule upon the illegality of atmospheric nuclear weapon testing);
Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Interim Protection Order, 1973 I.C.J. 135 (June 22)
(encouraging France to avoid nuclear testing barring resolution of the dispute); see
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Dispute resolution mechanisms under treaties are generally limited
to the subject matter governed by the applicable treaty, thus
making complex substantive cases, such as the Shrimp-Turtle cases,
difficult to resolve.74 One critique of the increased judicialization
of the WTO argues that the contentious nature of adjudication can
lead to heightened hostility between nations as compared to
negotiation or conciliation, and may undermine negotiation by
making it more difficult to resume talks if a party refuses to accept
a final judicial decision.75
Other limitations also affect adjudication. Adjudication is slow
and costly. Court judgments may take years, during which time
the nature of the dispute will have undoubtedly changed. This
makes implementing judgments challenging.76 Many countries
and non-state actors view courts as a place for Westernized justice
and concerns about the lack of diversity of judges and court bias
persist.77 Finally, there are capacity limitations. The ICJ, for
example, lacks the capacity to consider all potential disputes over
which it could assume jurisdiction. From 1946 to 1996, the ICJ
assumed jurisdiction over 75 contentious cases and issued 39
judgments on the merits and 22 advisory cases and opinions.78
also Laura Horn, The Role of Mediation in International Environmental Law, 4 AUSTL.
DISP. RESOL. J. 16 (1993).
74 The Shrimp-Turtle cases involved a dispute over a trade measure
implemented by the United States to prohibit the import of shrimp from countries
that were not using turtle excluder devices, which was challenged as inconsistent
with GATT. See TIM STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 326–31 (2009) (explaining the basis for the WTO Appellate Body’s
decisions in the Shrimp-Turtles cases). See generally Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional
Linkage: Transcending “Trade and . . . ”, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 77, 89–90 (2002) (discussing
the difficulties arising from the “horizontal allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction”
in situations where it is unclear which international organization has jurisdiction
over a specific matter).
75 See Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order
for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 349, 396–97 (1994) (examining critical
arguments that “a propensity . . . to accentuate adjudication may bring about the
opposite of its intended effect”).
76 See GARY C. BRYNER, FROM PROMISES TO PERFORMANCE: ACHIEVING GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS 96–97 (1997) (describing challenges surrounding the
implementation of a decision in the context of a perpetually changing
environment).
77 See MICHELLE L. BURGIS, BOUNDARIES OF DISCOURSE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: MAPPING ARGUMENTS IN ARAB TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 19–37 (2009)
(characterizing the PCIJ’s jurisprudence treated “Third World states as objects, and
not subjects, of international law”) (emphasis in original).
78 Introduction, 51 INT'L CT. JUST. Y.B. 1, 3–7 (1996-1997).
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Since 1996, the number of cases submitted to the ICJ has grown in
size, scope and complexity. As of August 1, 2010, there were
fifteen contentious cases and one advisory case pending before the
ICJ.79
These critiques of adjudication highlight its central
limitations and challenge its placement as the prominent IDR
method.
3.2. Overlooking Mediation
A second critique of the international dispute resolution system
is related to the first. Just as adjudication has been the focus of
IDR, mediation has been undervalued and overlooked.80 There is a
lack of institutional capacity at the international level for
mediation. There is no standing body equivalent to the ICJ to
provide mediation services to states for international disputes.
Although the PCA and the ICSID provide conciliation, they do not
offer mediation. The use of mediation for international disputes, in
both the legal and armed conflict contexts, remains ad hoc.81
Mediation lacks formal enforcement mechanisms under
international law, so compliance is voluntary or coerced through
political pressure and other means. Without proper recognition in
the architecture of the IDR system, mediation lacks the power and
institutional support associated with adjudicatory forums that
have a place in the international legal regime.82 Furthermore, there
are no universally accepted procedural rules governing the use and
practice of mediation. Private mediation providers such as the
American Arbitration Association and the International Mediation
Institute have developed protocols for certifying mediators in the

79 See Pending Cases, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket
/index.php?p1=3&p2=1 (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
80 See CESARE P. R. ROMANO, THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 46–64 (2000) (detailing
treatment of the use of negotiation, consultation, good offices, mediation, inquiry,
and conciliation in international environmental disputes).
81 Christine Chinkin, Alternative Dispute Resolution Under International Law, in
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA 123, 124–25
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1998) (stating that mediation and other forms of dispute
resolution were used for the most part on an ad hoc basis, resulting in underutilization during the Cold War).
82 See generally Edward N. Luttwak, Give War A Chance, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 36
(1999) (arguing that dispute settlement prevents lasting peace by interrupting
wars between minor powers, which should be allowed to run their course).
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practice of international mediation.83 But, to date, there is no
venue for determining standards or qualifying international
mediators that is generally accepted by the international
community or recognized under international law.
This is important because states prefer mediation to
adjudication for resolving disputes that arise in the context of interstate armed conflicts. Two empirical studies support this claim.
The first study conducted by Bercovitch and Fretter surveyed the
use of dispute resolution methods in 343 international conflicts
occurring between 1945 and 2003, and found that states’ preference
for mediation was the highest, followed by negotiation, with
arbitration coming in last.84 A second empirical study supports
these findings, showing that mediation, categorized as a
diplomatic method, is the most prevalent form of third-party
conflict management. The other methods, by category, include
verbal
expressions
(negotiations,
demands),
diplomacy
(inquiry/fact-finding, good offices, conciliation), legal processes
(arbitration, judicial settlement, war crimes tribunal), civil
administration
(humanitarian
assistance),
and
military
85
involvement (demobilizations, peacekeeping). Judicial settlement
at the ICJ remains the method of last resort for state actors.86
Therefore, there is tension between the IDR method states prefer in
this context and the capacity presently provided for by the IDR
system.

83 See,
e.g., How to become IMI Certified, INT’L MEDIATION INST.,
http://www.imimediation.org/how-to-become-imi-certified (last visited Oct. 25,
2010) (providing general information on International Mediation Institute
certification).
84 See BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, supra note 15, at 29 fig. 2 (illustrating that in a
study of 343 registered conflicts, 59.3% used mediation while only 0.6% resorted
to arbitration).
85 See Frazier & Dixon, supra note 16, at 394–96 (using a dataset documenting
conflict management of militarized inter-state disputes occurring from 1946 to
2000); id. at 400 (noting that mediation is an effective technique to produce
settlements but arguing that military intermediary actions, such as peacekeeping,
are more useful).
86 See BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, supra note 15, at 27–28 (suggesting that the
costly, slow, and retroactive nature of judicial settlement is often unsatisfactory in
cases where harms with irreversible effects were not prevented); see also BURGIS,
supra note 77 (discussing the historical reluctance of developing countries to use
the ICJ due to concerns about bias and lack of diversity); ROMANO, supra note 80,
at 92 (stating that it is “an indisputable fact that . . . litigation in international law
is a matter of last resort”).
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The following critiques of international mediation have
contributed to perceptions about its lack of value. First, while the
United Nations is the most recognized provider of mediation for
international conflict, there are criticisms about the United Nation’s
effectiveness in this role. Historically, the U.N. Secretary-General
has offered good offices to states on the brink of, or engaged in,
war. In addition, the U.N. Department of Political Affairs houses
the U.N. Mediation Support Unit, a center that provides
educational and operational support for mediation.87 In 2008, a
five-person Mediation Support Standby Team was developed to
allow for the deployment of mediators to conflict areas on short
notice to lend expertise in areas including power sharing,
constitution formation, security, human rights and justice.88 Yet,
arguably, this is not the best institution to provide mediation. The
U.N. lacks the human and financial capacity to meet demands for
mediation services in international conflicts.89 States often seek
assistance from the U.N. for the most difficult cases and at the
stage when the conflict is least capable of being resolved.90 Notable
mediation failures include the efforts of U.N. missions to prevent
new conflicts in Darfur (2007), Afghanistan (2006) and Georgia
(1994).91 An empirical study of 295 conflicts between 1945 and

87 See
Peacemaking,
U.N.
DEP’T
OF
POLITICAL
AFFAIRS,
www.un.org/depts/dpa/peace.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) (discussing the
role of U.N. peacekeeping and the various entities that support peacekeeping
functions); see also Press Release, Dep’t of Pub. Info., United Nations Announces
New ‘On-Call’ Mediation Team to Advise Peace Envoys in Field, U.N. Press
Release PA/1 (Mar. 5, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs
/2008/pa1.doc.htm (announcing the formation of a new Standby Team of
Mediation Experts in an effort to build up capacity for preventive diplomacy).
88 See UN: Norway Supported “On Call” Mediation Team is a Valuable Resource,
NORWAY:
MISSION
TO
THE
UN,
www.norway-un.org/News/News2009/110609_MSU (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) (noting that the team is
administered by the Norwegian Refugee Council on behalf of the MSU); id.
(noting that team members serve one-year terms and were first deployed to
Kenya in March 2008 during the post-election conflict).
89 See Peacemaking, supra note 87 (outlining steps that are being taken in an
effort to increase the U.N.’s capacity to handle international disputes); see also
Press Release, supra note 87 (considering a $21 million proposal to sustain and
enhance U.N. peacemaking activities).
90 See Saadia Touval, Why the UN Fails, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 44, 46–48 (1994)
(characterizing the U.N. as a “last-ditch, last resort affair” and noting that it is not
surprising that the organization is often blamed for its failure to solve problems).
91 See Greg Mills & Terence McNamee, Mission Improbable: International
Interventions, the United Nations, and the Challenge of Conflict Resolution, in
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1995 showed that mediation by the U.N. resulted in a 35.7%
success rate. Both regional organizations and mediation provided
by a mix of institutions had higher success rates (44.8% and 40%
respectively).92 This suggests that efforts to develop mediation
capacity at the international level must consider the appropriate
institutional level and perhaps reconsider the role of the U.N..
Beyond skepticism about the role of the U.N., there are
concerns about the dangers of mediation in general that are not
well developed and lead to concerns about its efficacy. One
critique is that in encouraging parties to be forward-looking, the
mediation process does not treat the need to establish facts and
determine attribution for past harms.93
Without adequate
safeguards, mediation may fail to deal with important power
imbalances and intensify a conflict. The mediation effort in
Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide is one costly example of this.94
Mediation can empower spoilers in cases where one or more
parties are not participating in good faith. In prioritizing the
interests of the parties present, there is a concern that mediation
agreements that violate interests of public importance may be
permitted and may inhibit long-term peace. For example, when
parties in mediation prioritize short-term security goals95 or the
mediator pursues a cease-fire agreement, these priorities often
detract from, or ignore altogether, underlying causes of the
dispute.96 It may be the case that mediation is not effective in
certain contexts. Failure rates linked to geographic indicators

CONUNDRUM 57, 57–64 (Brett D. Schaefer ed., 2009) (discussing the failure of
conflict resolution in Afghanistan, Georgia, and Sudan).
92 BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 67 tbl.2.
93 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and
Human Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 7 (2004) (identifying the different components necessary for
successful dispute resolution).
94 See Melanie Greenberg, Mediating Massacres: When “Neutral, Low-Power”
Models of Mediation Cannot and Should Not Work, 19 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 185,
200–05 (2003) (explaining the failure of mediation prior to the ethnic cleansing that
occurred in Rwanda in 1994).
95 See JEROME DELLI PRISCOLI & AARON T. WOLF, MANAGING AND
TRANSFORMING WATER CONFLICTS 33–49 (2009) (discussing alternative dispute
resolution in the context of water resources disputes).
96 See E. Franklin Dukes, What We Know About Environmental Conflict
Resolution: An Analysis Based on Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 191, 192–93 (2004)
(analyzing and comparing the characteristics of environmental conflict resolution
with other procedures).
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illustrate that efforts to mediate regional conflicts in Latin America
have generally not been successful.97
Finally, the ad hoc and confidential nature of mediation makes
documenting its use and lessons learned difficult. The absence of
empirical information about international mediation discredits its
validity as a field of scholarly study. Until recently, most sources
on the subject came from narrative accounts of individual success
stories.98 This provides context-specific data but not information
about the use of the method as a whole. Because mediation is
confidential, detailed information about what happened during the
process, why parties made certain decisions, etc., is generally not
publicly available. Accounts remain largely firsthand, as an
individual who was present writes about the case, typically long
after the mediation concluded. Without an institution to keep
track of lessons learned, there is limited evidence for establishing
what works, when it works, and why it works. The lack of data
contributes to an underdeveloped body of work on mediation in
international legal scholarship as well. Yet, mediation’s secrecy
makes it attractive to states because confidentiality can limit
political risks associated with resolving disputes.99
Given these critiques, understanding how mediation is used
and the criteria that contribute to its success may help to elevate its
value as a form of IDR. Mediation is commonly understood to be a
form of third-party dispute resolution that is voluntary,
confidential, non-binding, ad hoc, and informal in nature. The
practice of mediation in the international context is varied.100 For
example, scholars define mediation as non-coercive and
facilitative, but in practice coercive and directive mediation styles
97 See Carolyn M. Shaw, Conflict Management in Latin America, in REGIONAL
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 123, 149 (Paul F. Diehl & Joseph Lepgold eds., 2003)
(“[T]he guerrilla insurgencies and drug war in Colombia and Peru . . . are far from
ideal for achieving a diplomatic settlement.”).
98 See Jacob Bercovitch, Introduction: Putting Mediation in Context, in STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION 3, 22 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 2002) (stating that until
recent decades, scholarly research into human conflict and their manner of
resolution was rare and marginal).
99 See G. Shinkaretskaya, supra note 69, at 90 (discussing the advantages of
non-judicial methods including their ability to allow the parties to find political
compromises).
100 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Advisory System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 36–38 (1996) (discussing
how mediation falls between formal litigation and informal discussions on the
spectrum of dispute resolution methods).
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are employed.101 Mediation can be used proactively and is
procedurally open to a variety of stakeholders. Mediators use
process-based skills to elicit interests, identify zones of agreement
and facilitate resolution. The mediation process engages parties in
setting an agenda and addressing timing issues.102 Mediation
helps adjust disputants’ expectations by promoting conformity103
and problem-solving behavior that, in turn, enhance the formation
of legitimate outcomes by exerting normative restraints when
participants adopt shared expectations.104 It can also abate
constraints, which prevent parties from reaching resolution by
lowering political costs through face-saving and promoting flexible
bargaining.105 Mediation can prevent escalation while addressing
the entire range of issues involved in the dispute.106 Because
mediation is nonbinding, it provides states with problem-solving
opportunities that do not infringe on sovereignty.
Scholars have developed criteria for measuring the
effectiveness of international mediation. Mediation success is
influenced by the nature and timing of the dispute, the skill and
status of the mediator, strategy, and conflict history.107 Parties may
need to recognize that they have a low probability of getting what
101 See William Zartman & Saadia Touval, International Mediation in the PostCold War Era, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS 445, 445–61 (Chester A. Crocker et al.
eds., 1996) (analyzing various participants’ motives in meditation during
international conflicts).
102 See BRECHER & WILKENFELD, supra note 35, at 185–86 (2000) (discussing the
effects of third-party intervention in an international crisis).
103 See Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, in ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 115, 117–19 (Michael Freeman ed., 1995) (proposing that one
of mediation’s objectives is to have disputants conform to and accept social
norms).
104 See generally JOAQUIN TACSAN, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1992) (studying the effectiveness of international law in
conflict resolution through the International Legal Dynamics framework and the
expectations participants derive through legal reasoning).
105 See id. (analyzing the benefits political disputants can receive by engaging
in mediation during an international conflict).
106 See Charles Kegley & Gregory Raymond, Third Party Mediation and
International Norms: A Test of Two Models, 9 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 33, 37
(1985) (“[M]ediation . . . deals with the entire political context of a dispute rather
than with narrow legal technicalities.”).
107 See SAM KAGEL & KATHY KELLY, THE ANATOMY OF MEDIATION: WHAT
MAKES IT WORK 114–15 (1989) (discussing preference for different meeting styles
at different phases of mediation); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation—A Preferred
Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP. L. REV. S5, S16 (1989) (discussing the various
steps and factors involved in mediation).
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they want through unilateral action before they engage third-party
Furthermore, mediation style affects outcome.
assistance.108
Directive strategies are more effective for high intensity conflict;
“[P]rocedural strategies and regional mediators are effective in
resolving low intensity conflicts . . . . ”109 International mediators
who have resources, prestige, and physical distance from the
dispute are the most effective for high intensity, while regional
mediators or those with local contextual understanding are most
effective for low intensity disputes.110 Thus, it is important to
assess the intensity level of situation. A mediator’s power also
affects outcome.
Mediators exert power through coercion,
persuasion, and acculturation. Sources of mediator power include
reputation (i.e., credibility and prior track-record), the backing of a
powerful entity such as a nation or the U.N., and the ability to
access resources. The perceived lack of power in mediation is that
mediators cannot force agreements or enforce outcomes, although
this makes assumptions about authoritarian approaches to
resolving conflict.111
Mediation has been used successfully in a variety of
international conflicts and disputes. For example, in the Amur
River Dispute between China and Russia, the underlying issue was
an unclear boundary demarcation along a portion of the Amur
River and several islands.112 Russia claimed that ownership rights
were granted under the 1858 Treaty of Adigun and the 1860 Peking
Treaty. Although seemingly a legal matter, the parties resolved the
dispute through a joint field-mapping exercise of the disputed area
where they agreed to divide the islands in half. The process, which
involved mediation, worked so well that they followed a similar
arrangement in the Argun River Dispute.113
Other notable
108 See Lawrence Susskind & Eileen Babbitt, Overcoming Obstacles to Effective
Mediation of International Disputes, in MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 30,
48 (Jacob Bercovitch & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1992) (offering five criteria for
effective international mediation).
109 Jacob Bercovitch & Scott S. Gartner, Is There Method in the Madness of
Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation, 32 INT’L
INTERACTIONS 329, 329 (2006).
110 See id. at 351. (explaining the qualities of the best mediators for different
types of conflicts).
111 See Fuller, supra note 103, at 315 (discussing the role of authority in
mediation).
112 See RONGXING GUO, TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: A
GLOBAL HANDBOOK, 45–47 (2007) (describing the dispute over the Amur River).
113 See id. at 50-51 (detailing the dispute surrounding the Argun River).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

SPAIN.DOC

26

11/23/2010 3:49 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 32:1

examples of mediation success in the international context include
a series of IDR efforts, including mediation by the World Bank that
took place between India and Pakistan resulting in the 1960 Indus
Waters Treaty that addressed conflict over water rights pertaining
to the Indus River.114 Another example is the Vatican’s mediation
of the 1981 Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile,
which took place after direct negotiations, a referral to the ICJ and
arbitration by a British panel failed.115 Also noteworthy were
George Mitchell’s efforts in bringing an end to active armed
conflict in Northern Ireland.116
The context in which mediation is offered and accepted is
important. One study that analyzed empirical data on the
variations in the offer and acceptance of mediation in intra-state vs.
inter-state militarized conflict occurring between 1946 and 1999
suggests that there are important mediation differences between
inter-state and intra-state armed conflicts. States are more likely to
accept mediation (by state mediators) in an intra-state context than
an inter-state context.117 Mediation (by states) is more likely to be
114 See S. M. A. Salman, Good Offices and Mediation and International Water
Disputes, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 155, 183–92 (The Int’l
Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003) (presenting a case study
of the World Bank’s mediation efforts and attributing its success to: continued
involvement at the highest level, flexibility, successful use of pressure and
concessions, ability to secure adequate funding, and active engagement in
implementation).
115 See THOMAS PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 135–85
(1992) (offering a detailed account of the Vatican’s six-year mediation efforts and
noting that Argentina’s transition in 1983 to a democratic government may have
been paramount to the outcome); James L. Garrett, The Beagle Channel Dispute:
Confrontation and Negotiation in the Southern Cone, J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. &
WORLD AFF. 81, 81 (1985) (discussing the history and importance of the Beagle
Channel dispute); M. C. Mirow, International Law and Religion in Latin America: The
Beagle Channel Dispute, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 15–27 (2004) (discussing
the role played by the Vatican as a religious institution).
116 See generally GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE (1999) (discussing the
history of Northern Ireland’s end to armed conflict); Daniel Curran & James K.
Sebenius, The Mediator as Coalition Builder: George Mitchell in Northern Ireland, 8
INT’L NEGOTIATION 111, 111 (2003) (analyzing George Mitchell’s approach to
mediation in Northern Ireland as a way of understanding mediation more
generally).
117 See Molly M. Melin & Isak Svensson, Incentives for Talking: Accepting
Mediation in International and Civil Wars, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 249, 261 (2009)
(noting that acceptance rate for mediation is 86% for civil wars and 66% for interstate conflicts, however mediation is also more likely to be offered in civil wars).
Table 1 describes that 14% of militarized intra-state conflicts received an offer of
mediation compared to 1% of militarized inter-state conflicts. Id. at 260–61. The
acceptance rate of mediation for intra-state conflicts was 86% compared to 66% for
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offered in intra-state conflicts than inter-state conflicts. Duration of
the conflict increases the likelihood of mediation acceptance in
intra-state cases, but not inter-state ones.118 State mediators with a
history of conflict management are more likely to offer
mediation.119 State offers to mediate intra-state conflicts are
dependent upon expectations of acceptance, thereby indicating the
presence of selection bias.120 Mediation is more likely to occur in
International disputes
international military rivalries.121
characterized as highly complex, intense and of long duration; and
in cases in which the parties have not been willing to reach an
agreement.122
In conclusion, the value of mediation as a means for resolving
international disputes in all contexts is worthy of further study.
Beyond scholarship, it is important to build additional capacity at
the international institutional level for mediation and develop a
more complex understanding about how it contributes to the
overall value of the IDR system.
3.3. Structural Fragmentation
The third critique is that the architecture of the IDR system is
designed around a framework that understands IDR as a collection
of single method approaches. This is descriptively inaccurate
because it fails to account for the full spectrum of IDR practices
that extends beyond single approach methods, which are

inter-state conflict. Id. Factors that increase the acceptance rate of an offer to
mediate include historical or colonial ties; alliances and trade interests; history of
conflict management on the behalf of the state mediator; and duration of the
conflict for intra-state wars. Id. at 262–64.
118 See id. at 263–64 (noting that in civil wars duration increases likelihood of
successful mediation, but duration is ineffective in inter-state conflicts).
119 See id. at 263 (recognizing that mediators with previous experience in
conflict mediation are more successful).
120 See id. at 256 (discussing a study of third-party intervention by states into
militarized inter-state disputes and civil conflict data sets between 1946-1999.
This study did not include data about international organizations providing thirdparty intervention).
121 See Jacob Bercovitch & Paul F. Diehl, Conflict Management of Enduring
Rivalries: The Frequency, Timing and Short-Term Impact of Mediation, 22 INT’L
INTERACTIONS 299, 299 (1997) (exploring “how often mediation actually occur in
the context of enduring rivalries and . . . at what phase(s) mediation efforts are
undertaken”).
122 See BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 32–46 (discussing typical
characteristics of mediation and international conflict resolution).
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examined in Part 4. This Part focuses on a second critique. By
promoting single method approaches, the structure of the IDR
system fosters fragmentation between methods and the institutions
that provide them.
Scholars have traditionally categorized the IDR system as a
menu of single method approaches that range from negotiation to
non-binding, third-party intervention to legal approaches.123
Defining the system in this manner presents methods in ways that
divide and separate.124 Process selection is based on dichotomies
such as binding or nonbinding; legal or diplomatic; settlement or
resolution. Legal disputes are often tracked to adjudication, while
disputes considered to be high-intensity and political in nature are
tracked to diplomatic methods. But this is antithetical to the
interconnected nature of international disputes that involve legal,
political, social, cultural, and economic issues. Furthermore, these
distinctions can be illusory because it is often difficult to accurately
assess and separate legal and political dimensions of a dispute at
the onset of the situation.
These factors contribute to
fragmentation between IDR methods when parties frame their
choices as binary, electing one form of IDR over all others.
The descriptive framework of the IDR system also conflates the
choice of method with achieving a particular objective instead of
understanding them as tools that can be used to achieve a variety
of aims. It supports assumptions that particular methods work for
certain categories of cases but does not foster careful and nuanced
assessment of the dispute before selecting or designing an
appropriate process.
Rigid understandings promote value
judgments and promote the tendency to substitute one method’s

123 See
generally PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS & TRIBUNALS,
http://www.pict-pcti.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) (providing examples of this
descriptive approach. The menu could be extended to include political methods
and various forms of military intervention such as peacekeeping or humanitarian
intervention).
124 See
Geir
Ulfstein,
Institutions
and
Competences,
in
THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45, 67-68 (Jan Klabbers et al. eds.,
2009) (noting analogous concerns in the arena of international institutions: the
relationship between institutions is characterized by functional differentiation,
and fragmentation causes wasted resources and conflicting objectives); Cesare P.
R. Romano, Deciphering the Grammar of the International Jurisprudential Dialogue, 41
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 755, 755 (2009) (discussing how international court
jurisprudence is interrelated).
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evaluative criteria for another.125 For example, if the value of IDR
methods is based on criteria specific to adjudication—its ability to
enforce outcomes through a legally binding process—then this deemphasizes the value of other options. When measured against
this criterion, voluntary, nonbinding IDR methods are perceived as
less valuable.126 Meanwhile, the value of mediation is in its ability
to compel outcomes based on the power of persuasion and
acculturation, not coercion. Measuring mediation against criteria
developed for adjudication ignores the important benefits
mediation provides, such as its ability to create new norms, not
merely persuade parties to conform to existing ones,127 which
makes mediation preferable in situations where the long-term
relationship between parties must stay intact.
Third, there is no framework for understanding how to
systematically integrate the use of different and multiple methods
across forums. This deficiency obscures the reality that many
international conflicts and disputes are addressed through
multiple processes. But there is no place in the current IDR system
to classify approaches that use multiple IDR methods sequentially,
or approaches that integrate aspects of different methods into one
process. Thus, they remain categorized as ad hoc methods.
Fourth, this deficiency also fosters fragmentation between
institutions within the IDR system.
The International Law
Commission (“ILC”) considered the impact of diversification and
fragmentation on international law in its 2006 report.128 While it
did not focus specifically on procedural or institutional
fragmentation, other scholars have.129 One concern is that the
See Fuller, supra note 103, at 115 (discussing the function of mediation in
facilitating negotiation in collective bargaining relationships).
126 See generally Chinkin, supra note 81 (providing examples that further
display the decreased value of mediation when measured against adjudication
specific criteria).
127 See Fuller, supra note 103, at 307–08 (noting that mediation both forces
awareness of current social norms and contributes to the formulation of
innovative norms).
128 See generally Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Int’l Law
Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682
(Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter ILC Report] (report of the study group detailing the
complications arising from the increasing diversity of international law tribunals).
129 See, e.g., STEPHENS, supra note 74, at 304–42 (looking at the fragmentary
effects of multiple international courts on international environmental law);
Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International
Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101, 117 (1998) (exploring the fragmentary
125
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proliferation of international courts and the judicialization of
international disputes have led to a multiplicity of dispute
resolution options that are uncoordinated. If courts provide
different opinions on similar matters, this may lead to fragmented
jurisprudence and judicial practices.130 This concern is multiplied
when considering other forms of IDR. For example, the ICJ could
address a legal aspect of a dispute while mediation is being used to
resolve extra-legal issues without either group recognizing or
coordinating with the efforts of the other. If the legal question is
adjudicated and the political interests are mediated, how should
these outcomes be integrated to achieve common goals, such as
violence reduction or stable governance? Answering questions
such as this demands developing a more accurate descriptive
understanding of the relationships between the methods and
institutions of the IDR system.
4.

RECOGNIZING HYBRID APPROACHES TO IDR: MULTIPLE
METHODS AND MIXED METHODS

The benefits of IDR extend beyond single method approaches
but the system fails to provide a framework for understanding

effects of a high number of tribunals on international law); Gerhard Hafner, Pros
and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 849,
849 (2004) (detailing the upside and downside of procedural and institutional
fragmentation in international law); Christian Leathley, An Institutional Hierarchy
to Combat the Fragmentation of International Law: Has the ILC Missed an Opportunity?,
40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 259, 271 (2007) (proposing an institutional hierarchy as
a possible solution to the problem of fragmentation in international law).
130 See generally STEPHENS, supra note 74, at 304-42 (detailing the lack of
uniformity in the application of international environmental law caused by the
proliferation of ruling bodies); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Unity of Application of
International Law at the Global Level and the Responsibility of Judges, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (2007) (proposing an institutional hierarchy and uniform judicial
application of law as solutions to the lack of unity in the enforcement of
international law); Rosalyn Higgins, supra note 66, at 1 (2003) (detailing the
detrimental effects on coherent human rights protection in Europe stemming from
the disparate rulings of different tribunals); Bruno Simma, Universality of
International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 265 (2009)
(exploring the challenges posed by the proliferation of international tribunals and
courts). But see Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between
Technique and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (viewing international law not as
a true legal system in the national sense and not subject to the same concerns
about fragmentation); Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of
International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 553 (2002)
(suggesting that concerns regarding the fragmentation of international law may
be exaggerated).
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what these options are or how they fit into the overall structure.
This Part examines the use of IDR beyond single method
approaches and identifies two additional categories: (1) multiple
method approaches, defined here as the use of more than one IDR
method in the same case, in sequential order;131 and (2) mixed
method approaches, defined here as the integration of more than
one IDR method into a hybrid process where different methods are
used at the same time. This Part begins by analyzing the
application of multiple method approaches in a variety of cases
and identifies the current institutional capacity for its use. The Part
further considers a case study that illustrates a mixed method
approach. I conclude by considering how these hybrid approaches
can extend the practice of IDR in innovative ways that mitigate the
limitations identified in Part 3.
4.1. The Use of Multiple Methods in IDR
This Part explores how multiple methods have been used
sequentially in the course of addressing the same dispute. First,
parties use negotiation or mediation to reach an agreement to
submit the dispute to adjudication. For example, in the Pedra
Branca dispute between Malaysia and Singapore, both countries
engaged in negotiations prior to referring the case to adjudication
before the ICJ.132 Moreover, they also used these methods after
adjudication to achieve further cooperation.
After the ICJ
determined that Singapore possessed sovereignty over Pedra
Branca and Malaysia had sovereignty over Middle Rocks,133 the

131 See Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R.
Wheeler eds., 1979) (describing examples of multiple method approaches in the
United States such as the combination of litigation and mediation in multi-door
courthouses).
132 The nations negotiated the terms of the Special Agreement to submit the
dispute to the ICJ. See S. JAYAKUMAR & TOMMY KOH, PEDRA BRANCA: THE ROAD TO
THE WORLD COURT 35 (2009) (detailing the negotiations leading up to the
resolution by the ICJ). See generally Tan Hsien-Li, Case Concerning Sovereignty Over
Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore),
12 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. & CONTRIBUTORS 257 (2008) (describing the territorial dispute
in detail); Coalter G. Lathrop, International Decisions: Sovereignty Over Pedra
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 828 (2008)
(examining the dispute in the ICJ, its resolution, and the parties’ acquiescence).
133 See Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and
South Ledge (Malay./Sing.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 12, 102 (May 23) (providing a
factual basis to support its conclusion that Pedro Branca belongs to Singapore).
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countries developed a joint technical commission to delimit the
maritime boundary in the area.134
Second, parties use mediation to resolve a dispute when other
approaches have failed. For example, in the Thailand-Philippines
dispute over tuna exports, the parties agreed to submit the dispute
to mediation if consultations facilitated by the EU Trade
Commissioner failed to produce a settlement.135 On September 4,
2002, the parties submitted a letter to the WTO Secretary-General
requesting mediation; on October 16, 2002, WTO Deputy DirectorGeneral Rufus Yerxa was appointed mediator136 pursuant to
Article 5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”).137 Yerxa issued an advisory
opinion on December 20, 2002, which called for the European
Community (“EC”) to establish a quota and tariff rates; and on
June 5, 2003, after months of lobbying by Thailand and the
Philippines, the EC adopted Yerxa’s recommendation in EU
Council Regulation No. 975/2003.138 The use of mediation in this
context was directive, with Yerxa offering his own solution to the
parties.
In other cases, non-judicial forms of IDR are used after
adjudication to facilitate implementation of the award and/or
resolve outstanding issues. For example, PCA awards have
134 See generally Li Xueying, Navigating the Rocks Ahead May Be Tricky: But
Experts Confident Any Unresolved Issues Will Be Ironed Out, STRAITS TIMES, May 24,
2008, available at http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/legal/general_news/pedra
_branca_belongs_to_singapore.html (explaining the issues facing the joint
technical commission); ICJ Awards Pedra Branca's Sovereignty to Singapore,
CHANNELNEWSASIA.COM,
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singapore
localnews/view/349592/1/.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (detailing the
judgment of the ICJ and the creation of the joint technical commission).
135 Nilaratna Xuto, Thailand: Conciliating a Dispute on Tuna Exports to the EC, in
MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION: 45 CASE STUDIES 555, 560
(Peter Gallagher et al. eds., 2005), available at www.wto.org/english
/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case40_e.htm (detailing the agreement by the
parties to submit to mediation, should the consultations fail).
136 Request for Mediation by the Philippines, Thailand and the European
Communities, Communication from the Director-General, para. 5, WT/GC/66 (Oct.
16, 2002).
137 See id. para. 4 (providing that the appointed mediator will follow
guidelines set by the DSU). See generally Faizel Ismail, The Role of the Chair in the
WTO Negotiations from the Potsdam Collapse in June 2007-June 2008, 43 J. WORLD
TRADE 1145, 1149–50 (2009) (noting the positive contribution the chair served in
agenda management and brokerage during the negotiations.)
138 See Xuto, supra note 135, at 563 (outlining how the parties approached
mediation as an alternative should traditional trade negotiations fail).
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acknowledged the value of using such approaches, in addition to
adjudication, to address extra-legal aspects of a case139 and have
promoted the additional use of non-judicial IDR in order to
support decisions. This was the case in the Abyei arbitration
between the Government of Sudan and the People’s Liberation
Army of Sudan.140 At issue was a dispute about boundary
demarcation, oil, water, and grazing rights. The PCA addressed
the dispute by dividing the territory between the two parties.
The process of arbitrating this dispute unfolded in the
following way. The parties signed the Arbitration Agreement on
July 7, 2008, authorizing the referral of the dispute to the PCA for
final and binding arbitration. At issue was whether or not the
Abyei Boundaries Commission (“ABC”), established by the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (“CPA”),141 exceeded its
mandate under the CPA to delimit and demarcate an area
identified as the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms. The parties agreed
in the Arbitration Agreement to authorize the PCA, upon a finding
that the Commission did exceed its mandate to delimit and
demarcate the area in dispute. The PCA determined that the ABC
did exceed its mandate in part. The PCA redrew the boundaries
and in doing so, reduced the Abyei areas and demarcated the oil
fields to the territory belonging to the North. In its decision, the
PCA determined that it is now up to the Parties to take the next
step, noting the need to develop a “survey team to demarcate the
Abyei Area as delimited by this Award,” and issuing its hopes
“that the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation visible throughout
these proceedings, particularly during the oral pleadings last April,

139 See Nejib Jibril, Note, The Binding Dilemma: From Bakassi to Badme–Making
States Comply with Territorial Decisions of International Judicial Bodies, 19 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 633, 662-67 (2004) (concluding that pressure and involvement from
the international community are needed to create binding arbitration agreements).
140 See Gov’t Sudan v. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (Abyei
Arb.), Final Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1306 (settling the dispute over the Abyei Area by
resolving conflicts over the boundary lines).
141 See The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of the
Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan
People’s Liberation Army, Gov’t Sudan-Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Jan. 9, 2005, available at www.aecsudan.org/docs/cpa/cpa-en.pdf (outlining the terms of the comprehensive peace
agreement established by the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army on Jan. 9,
2005).
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will continue to animate the Parties on this matter.”142 Despite the
concerns raised in Judge Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh’s dissenting
opinion, both parties announced that they would accept and abide
by the PCA’s ruling.143
The Abyei arbitration illustrates how a legal process allocated
ownership rights, demarcated territory, and imparted
responsibility on the parties for pursuing additional methods
toward reconciliation. However, the Tribunal recognized that the
Award was a “distinct stage in the peace process,” and, by
implication, not the only phase.144 The precise nature and timing
of these additional methods remains unspecified. Thus, the
Presidency of the Republic Sudan remains obligated to implement
the Award and address outstanding issues.145
The Pedra Branca dispute, Thailand-Philippines dispute, and
the Abyei arbitration show how different IDR methods were used
in a sequential manner. These cases demonstrate that multiple
method IDR is being used in mediation.
4.2. Procedural and Institutional Capacity for Multiple Method IDR
There are several IDR venues that have the institutional
capacity to provide multiple method approaches. As Part 3
identified, the institutional capacity for international mediation is
limited so this Part will focus on forums that provide a mix of
judicial settlement, arbitration, conciliation, other IDR methods or
a combination of any of these fora.
The PCA provides arbitration, conciliation, and fact-finding.146
Only states, their entities, and international organizations may
142 Gov’t Sudan v. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Final
Award,
para.
266
(Perm.
Ct.
Arb.
2009),
http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1306 (final award in the Abyei arbitration); see also
Hans, Abyei Arbitration Award, PEACE PALACE LIBRARY BLOG (July 22, 2009, 3:18
PM), http://peacepalacelibrary-weekly.blogspot.com/2009/07/abyei-arbitrationaward.html (summarizing the key elements of the final award of the Abyei
Arbitration).
143 See Hans, supra note 142, para. 7 (noting that the parties announced they
would abide by the award).
144 Gov’t Sudan v. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Final
Award, para. 768 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage
.asp?pag_id=1306 (final award in the Abyei arbitration).
145 See id. para. 769 (noting that it is the responsibility of the President of the
Republic of Sudan to ensure execution of the award).
146 See PERMANENT CT. OF ARB. OPTIONAL CONCILIATION RULES, available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/CONCENG.pdf
[hereinafter
PCA
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access these.147 The PCA’s conciliation and fact-finding services are
governed by the 1907 Hague Convention, the Rules of Conciliation,
and the 1997 Optional Rules for Fact-finding Commissions of
Inquiry.148 PCA conciliation panels consist of one to three
conciliators who “attempt to reach an amicable settlement” in any
manner appropriate, taking into account the wishes of the parties,
including proposing terms for settlement.149 While the PCA has
the capacity to offer all three of these IDR methods, it is less
apparent how they have been used in a sequential manner.
ITLOS operates as an independent international judicial body,
established by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (“UNCLOS”).150 Unlike other forums, ITLOS is accessible
in certain circumstances to private individuals and corporations in
addition to states, their entities, and international organizations.151
ITLOS provides arbitration and conciliation, as well as provisional
measures that offer creative approaches to dispute resolution.152
For example, in the Malaysia-Singapore case, the Tribunal embraced
a dispute-management approach by calling for “the establishment

OPTIONAL CONCILIATION RULES] (“The purpose of these Rules is to provide a
convenient basis for mutual agreement of parties on practical procedures that are
useful in the conciliation process.”); PERMANENT CT. OF ARB. OPTIONAL RULES FOR
FACT-FINDING
COMM’NS
OF
INQUIRY,
available
at
http://www.pcacpa.org/upload/files/INQENG.pdf (establishing optional rules of fact-finding
which parties may adopt at their discretion); 1907 Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of Int’l Disputes arts. 9, 15, Oct. 18 1907, http://www.pcacpa.org/upload/files/1907ENG.pdf [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]
(providing that the PCA may provide fact-finding to assist the Commission of
Inquiry and that the PCA “shall place its offices and staff at the disposal of the
Contracting Powers for the use of the Commission of Inquiry”).
147 See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 17, at 105–20 (detailing the institutional
and procedural aspects of arbitration before the PCA).
148 See 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 146, ch. 2 (establishing the PCA
and its procedure); see also MERRILLS, supra note 17, at 72–77 (providing a general
overview of the fact-finding and conciliation process).
149 See PCA OPTIONAL CONCILIATION RULES, supra note 146, arts. 3, 7
(indicating that between one to three conciliators may be employed and that
“[t]he conciliator assists the parties . . . in their attempt to reach an amicable
settlement of their dispute.”).
150 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 48, art.
284 (describing procedures for conciliation by a State Party).
151 Id. annex VI, art. 20 para. 1 (”The Tribunal shall be open to States
Parties.”).
152 See generally MERRILLS, supra note 17, at 190–203 (describing the
conciliation and arbitration framework established by UNCLOS and the
establishment of ITLOS).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

SPAIN.DOC

36

11/23/2010 3:49 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 32:1

of a group of independent experts to study the land reclamation
issues” and make recommendations.153
The WTO DSB is a political entity responsible for providing
WTO members with dispute settlement, supervising consultations
between disputing parties, adopting Appellate Body panel reports,
and supervising implementation of awards.154 The goal of the
WTO DSB is to protect established rights of WTO members and
provide a predictable and secure method for achieving decisions
regarding WTO disputes.155 The governing rules and procedures
provide disputing parties with the option of engaging in direct
consultations.156 In addition, parties may elect to pursue thirdparty intervention procedures of good offices, conciliation, and
mediation as an option between consultations and legally binding
decision-making by the ad hoc panel.157 These have proven
particularly satisfactory in disputes where there is a power
imbalance—whether perceived or real—between the nations
involved.158 The novelty of the WTO DSB as an IDR process is that
it blends “diplomacy, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and
adjudication.”159
ICSID provides arbitration and conciliation for investment
disputes among members to the Convention, which includes states
as well as their nationals (both individuals and companies).160
MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 17, at 68.
See id. at 73–74 (outlining the general responsibilities of the WTO DSB).
155 See id. at 72–73 (commenting on the motivation for establishing the WTO
dispute settlement system).
156 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (outlining the rules
and procedures for initiation of a consultation).
157 See id. art. 5 (outlining the rules and procedures for good offices,
conciliation, and mediation).
158 See Xuto, supra note 135, at 563 (”This case is a good example of how
developing country members were able to use their WTO rights to secure more
equitable treatment from a developed country trading partner.”); see also DSU,
supra note 156, art. 24(2) (requiring that the Director-General or Chairman of the
DSB offer good offices, conciliation, and mediation upon the request of “a leastdeveloped country”).
159 Surya P. Subedi, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as a New Technique
for Settling Disputes in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 173, 173 (Duncan French et al. eds., 2010).
160 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, arts. 25(1)–(2), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
(outlining the scope of the ICSID’s jurisdiction). The Additional Facility Rules
also allow for cases involving parties not contracted to the Convention or cases
153
154
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Typically, arbitration occurs through a tribunal while conciliation
occurs through a commission that is convened through the
agreement of the disputing parties and in accordance with ICSID
Convention provisions.161 The use of conciliation is minimal in
comparison to arbitration. As of December 31, 2009, ICSID had
completed six conciliation cases, representing 2% of its total
caseload.162
However, the ability to blend arbitration and
conciliation has been suggested in at least two ways. First, parties
are not prevented from resorting to arbitration if they choose to use
conciliation and it fails.163 Second, the parties may request that an
arbitrator assist them by serving a conciliation role.164
While this review is not a comprehensive identification of the
entirety of institutional capacity for multiple method IDR, it
provides an introduction to the venues capable of providing this
approach.
4.3. Mixing Methods? The Case of The Red Sea Islands Dispute
In addition to the multiple method approaches described
above, IDR methods can be combined in a more complex manner.
The following case study of the Red Sea Islands Dispute provides
involving non-investment issues. See RULES GOVERNING THE ADDITIONAL FACILITY
FOR THE ADMIN. OF PROCEEDINGS BY THE SECRETARIAT OF THE INT’L CTR. FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES art. 2, available at, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID

/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf (granting ICSID jurisdiction over
certain additional parties).
161 See Nassib G. Ziadé, ICSID Conciliation, 13 NEWS FROM ICSID 3, 5–6
(describing ICSID conciliation as having similar procedures as arbitration from
the initiation stage through the constitution of the Commission, after which the
proceedings differ because the process is non-adversarial in character and the
Conciliation Commission has no power to impose a decision on the parties, but
serves “‘to clarify the issues in dispute . . . and to endeavor to bring about
agreement between them upon mutually acceptable terms’” under Article 34(1) of
the ICSID Convention).
162 See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
THE ICSID CASELOAD—STATISTICS, 8 (2010) (indicating the breakdown of the type
of proceedings registered under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility
Rules: 285, 89%, were arbitration cases; 28, 9%, were additional facility arbitration
cases; and 6, 2%, were conciliation cases); see also MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 17,
at 128 (stating that as of September 30, 2009, 6 of 177 completed ICSID cases were
conciliation cases).
163 Ziadé, supra note 161, at 3 (stating that the ICSID does not prevent parties
from agreeing to first resort to conciliation and to subsequently arbitrate).
164 Id. at 7 (stating that parties sometimes seek help of arbitrators to “facilitate
an early amicable settlement”). Conversely, ICSID Arbitration Rule 1(4) prevents
a formal conciliator from being appointed to the Arbitral Tribunal.
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one illustrative example. Yemen and Eritrea had a dispute over
three groups of islands located in the Red Sea: Greater Hanish,
Mohabbakah, and Haycock. The Greater Hanish island group was
home to Yemeni fishing communities. Eritrea’s armed forces
stationed on the island during its conflict with Ethiopia remained.
In November of 1995, Eritrea ordered all Yemeni nationals to leave
the islands in response to their claim that Yemen had sent armed
forces to the area. On December 15, a low-level armed conflict
broke out and Eritrean forces took Yemeni POWs. At issue were
questions of sovereignty, access, and rights to tourism, fishing, and
minerals.165 On December 17, 1995, a cease-fire was reached by the
presidents of both nations with each nation claiming control of the
islands.
Various forms of IDR were initially tried with some attempts
occurring simultaneously.166 Eritrea suggested that they submit
the matter to the ICJ for decision while engaging in simultaneous
troop withdrawal.167 Yemen sought the return of its POWs and
Eritrean withdrawal as pre-conditions to negotiations, which
Eritrea rejected.168 Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister visited the islands
on December 21, 1995 and later proposed the following agreement:
return of the POWs, mutual withdrawal of troops monitored by a
neutral party and submission of the dispute to the ICJ.169 After
Eritrea returned Yemeni POWs, Yemen refused the proposal to
conduct simultaneous troop withdrawal. The parties could not
agree on which side would be the first to withdraw.170 On
December 23, Egypt began mediation and suggested that both

165 See Jeffrey Lefebvre, Red Sea Security and the Geopolitical-Economy of the
Hanish Islands Dispute, 52 MIDDLE E. J. 367, 373–76 (1998) (detailing the roots of the
conflict).
166 See B.G. Ramcharan, Preventing War between Eritrea and Yemen over the
Hanish Islands (1996), in CONFLICT PREVENTION IN PRACTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
JIM SUTTERLIN 157, 157–68 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 2005) (tracking the progression of
mediation methods utilized to prevent armed conflict between Yemen and
Eritrea).
167 See Daniel J. Dzurek, Eritrea-Yemen Dispute over the Hanish Islands, 1996
IBRU BOUNDARY & SEC. BULL. 70, 73 (providing an example of Eritrea’s attempts at
IDR).
168 See id. at 72–73 (explaining the respective demands of Yemen and Eritrea
during their failed attempts at mediation).
169 See id. at 73 (documenting Ethiopian involvement in mediations between
Yemen and Eritrea).
170 Id.
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countries participate in a summit to resolve the conflict; Yemen
rejected this proposal.171
Meanwhile, after the armed conflict, U.N. Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali sent personal letters to the presidents of both
nations urging diplomacy and military restraint. On December 29,
1995, he went to Yemen to mediate.172 Under Secretary-General
Ismat Kittani met with representatives from both countries and
France. The President of the Security Council also held meetings
urging support for French mediation efforts.173 The selection of the
mediator was a complex process involving a variety of regional
groups.174 These efforts persuaded both nations to accept French
mediation, which, under the direction of French Ambassador
Gutmann, monitored and observed the situation and created a
reliable record of events.175 A mediated agreement was reached on
May 21, 1996, though it was soon threatened when Eritrean forces
reoccupied the Greater Hanish islands that August.176 One of the
outstanding issues was the scope of the dispute. Eritrea claimed
that all the island groups were in dispute while Yemen maintained
that the issue was limited to the presence of Eritrean force located
on the Greater Hanish islands group.177 There were five additional
rounds of mediation after this event that eventually led to a second
agreement on October 3, 1996178 when, at the suggestion of the

171 See id. at 74 (noting that Yemen preferred the mediation proposal
presented by the French).
172 See 416 Red Sea Islands (1995), ICB DATA VIEWER, www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb
/dataviewer (open the drop-down menu entitled “select a crisis”; then select “416
– Red Sea Islands – 1995”) (last visited Oct. 24, 2010) (analyzing the involvement
of U.N. General-Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali).
173 See Ramcharan, supra note 166, at 167 (explaining the Security Council’s
concern over a continued Yemen-Eritrea conflict).
174 See Lefebvre, supra note 165, at 376–78 (noting that the League of Arab
States, the Organization of African Unity, Egypt, and allegedly Israel were
involved in trying to influence the mediation process).
175 See Ramcharan, supra note 166, at 168 (noting that French mediation
attempts eventually led to a peaceful resolution of the dispute).
176 See Lefebvre, supra note 165, at 381 (documenting the steps taken by
Francis Gutmann, the French diplomat, to mediate the dispute).
177 See Dzurek, supra note 167, at 74 (concluding that Eritrea and Yemen were
simply “talking past one another”).
178 See Lefebvre, supra note 165, at 381 (analyzing the hostile environment
present just before Yemen and Eritrea agreed to submit their dispute to an
international tribunal).
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French, Yemen and Eritrea decided to submit the dispute to
arbitration at the PCA.179
In 1998, the PCA issued its first Award, The 1998 Eritrea/Yemen
Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute Award (Phase I), where
it awarded the Mohabbakah and Haycock island groups to Eritrea
and the Hanish Islands to Yemen.180 This decision confirmed the
“preeminence of evidence of actual and effective occupation as a
source of title to territory over claims of historic title.”181 The
Award states: “[i]n the exercise of its sovereignty over these
islands, Yemen shall ensure that the traditional fishing regime of
free access and enjoyment for the fishermen of both Eritrea and
Yemen shall be preserved for the benefit of the lives and
livelihoods of this poor and industrious order of men,” thus noting
the need to preserve shared interests despite legal rights to
sovereignty.182 In 1999, the PCA issued a second award, The 1999
Eritrea/Yemen Maritime Delimitation Award (Phase II), delimiting
maritime boundaries and clarifying the fishing privileges provided
for in the first Award. The Award states that “[t]he traditional
fishing regime is not an entitlement in common to resources nor is
it a shared right in them. Rather, it entitles both Eritrean and
Yemeni fishermen to engage in artisanal fishing around the islands
which, in its Award on Sovereignty, the Tribunal attributed to
Yemen.”183 Eritrea and Yemen accepted the findings of the arbitral
panel with Eritrea stating that the award will “pave the way for a
harmonious relationship between the littoral states of the Red Sea,”
while Yemen called the Award the “culmination of a great
diplomatic effort.”184 As a practical matter, it remains to be
179 See id. at 379–80 (noting that this dispute occurred within the context of
Yemen’s border dispute with Saudi Arabia and the Eritrean government facing
increased opposition by internal groups).
180 See Eritrea v. Yemen, Award Phase 1, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998) http://www
.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/EY Phase I.pdf (awarding territorial sovereignty to
Yemen).
181 Barbara Kwiatkowska, The Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration: Landmark Progress in
the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty and Equitable Maritime Boundary
Delimitation, 2000 IBRU BOUNDARY & SEC. BULL. 66, 78.
182 Eritrea v. Yemen, Award Phase 1, para. 526 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998)
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/EY Phase I.pdf.
183 Eritrea v. Yemen, Award Phase 2, at para. 103 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1999)
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/EY Phase II.pdf.
184 See Kwiatkowska, supra note 181, at 67 (quoting Eritrean Foreign Minister
Haile Woldense and the Yemeni Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdulla
Mohammed Al-Saidi, respectively).
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determined what specific steps Eritrea and Yemen will employ in
order to achieve such collaborative relations.
4.4. Defining and Valuing Mixed Methods
The Red Sea Islands Dispute illustrates the complexities involved
when IDR methods are employed in an integrated manner that
goes beyond single method and multiple method approaches.
While defining mixed methods is difficult, conceptually, it is an
IDR approach that blends more than one method, or aspects of
different methods, into a single process.185
There are several approaches in other fields that clarify the
concept of mixed methods. In alternative dispute resolution
(“ADR”), mediation and arbitration have been combined into
hybrid processes now recognized as “med-arb” and “arb-med.”186
These processes, which developed out of necessity when thirdparty neutrals were called upon to provide both arbitration and
mediation services during a dispute, have evolved from ad hoc
practices into a recognized form of dispute resolution.187 In the
international context, the United Nations Compensation
Commission (“UNCC”), which was established by the U.N.
Security Council to determine and process claims to the victims of
Iraq’s invasion into Kuwait, provides a variety of IDR functions.188
The Panels of Commissioners provided quasi-judicial services in
making determinations about which parties were entitled to
compensation. The Secretariat has served in both fact-finding and
mediation capacities to assist in the formation of agreements
between members of the Governing Council.189 In the area of
This is a working definition and I look forward to additional comments.
See generally Barry C. Bartel, Comment, Med-Arb as a Distinct Method of
Dispute Resolution: History, Analysis, and Potential, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661
(1991) (explaining how these processes come about and are implemented).
187 For articles exploring med-arb and arb-med, see generally William H.
Ross & Donald E. Conlon, Note, Hybrid Forms of Third-Party Dispute Resolution:
Theoretical Implications of Combining Mediation and Arbitration, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
416 (2000) and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of
Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871 (1997).
188 For additional information about the form and function of the UNCC, see
generally JOSÉ ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 424–28
(2005) and UNITED NATIONS COMP. COMM’N, http://www.uncc.ch (last visited Oct.
24, 2010).
189 See The Secretariat, UNITED NATIONS COMP. COMM’N http://www.uncc.ch
/secretar.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2010) (explaining the role of the secretariat
within the UNCC).
185
186
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international criminal law, the mixing of judicial settlement with
transformative IDR methods has been employed. For example,
Gacaca Courts in post-conflict Rwanda that directly involved local
communities were utilized alongside national courts and an
international tribunal to serve the collective goal of achieving
justice and reconciliation.190 While these examples embody the
concept of integrating different methods into one hybrid process,
the IDR field needs to track where and how mixed method
approaches are being employed in order to further define the
concept. 191
Despite the need to develop a generally accepted conceptual
framework, it is worth considering the value of mixed method
IDR. First, mixed methods are capable of providing benefits that
single methods cannot.
If methods are combined in a
complementary manner that enhances the strengths of different
processes and mitigates weaknesses, this may offer superior
capacity.192 One critique identified in Part 3 was that mediation
lacks the institutional framework and financial support that
adjudication enjoys. Yet, the two processes need not be mutually
exclusive. The ICJ can enhance the problem-solving qualities of
mediation by providing the institutional capacity of a powerful
framework that establishes a protective environment as parties
engage in the cooperative, and sometimes vulnerable, venture of
problem solving. At the same time, mediation can pick up where
legal settlement stops by assisting parties in resolving matters that
extend beyond legal questions into political, environmental and
social matters. Such approaches can enhance the complementary
dynamics of power and cooperation. Furthermore, the concept of
combining substructures to create “mutually supportive” legal
190 See Rosemary Nagy, Traditional Justice and Legal Pluralism in Transitional
Context: The Case of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, in RECONCILIATION(S): TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 86, 86–87 (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 2009)
(describing how the Gacaca Courts operated in Rwanda and noting the use of
similar participatory processes in post-conflict Sierra Leone and East Timor).
191 See Schneider, supra note 54, at 796 (noting examples of mixed processes at
the Iran Claims Tribunal, Swiss Claims Tribunal, and Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary
claims commission and arguing that “the international community . . . has focused
on balancing diplomacy with the need for trials”).
192 See Dukes, supra note 96, at 194 (identifying the benefits and weaknesses
of environmental conflict resolution processes used in the United States and citing
a case study by Kloppenberg (2002) analyzing the management and outcome of 75
environmental cases in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon which
illustrate the reasons why isolated processes cause ineffective, poor results).
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systems is not new.193 It has been employed in environmental law,
trade194 and international criminal law.195
Second, mixed method IDR is particularly useful for
international conflicts because they are typically complex in their
involvement of legal, economic, cultural, and political disputes and
because they involve a diverse set of stakeholders. Given the
critiques of the limitations of adjudication and mediation
presented in Part 3, neither process is typically capable of
providing adequate recourse on its own. Adjudication provides
legal settlement that parties generally consider to be legitimate and
fair. However, the ICJ and other bodies often address narrow legal
arguments, but rarely opine on more complex disputes because
they lack the authority to decide non-legal matters. Mediation is
capable of addressing the full array of issues that are present in
resource disputes but lacks the power, institutional capacity, and
authority to constrain state behavior and enforce outcomes over
the long term. Integrating aspects of these and other IDR processes
like joint fact-finding and agenda setting into one process has the
potential to provide a multi-faceted approach capable of
responding to the more complex cases of international conflict and
disputes.
These implications are a starting point for additional research.
Scholars need to better assess how each IDR process addresses
aspects of a dispute and when processes should be combined.
193 As
understood in the context of determining jurisdictional
complementarity in international criminal law, particularly regarding the balance
between the ICC and national courts, combining substructures is not new. See
Jennifer S. Easterday, Deciding the Fate of Complementarity: A Colombian Case Study,
26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 52–53 (2002) (noting, as an example of
complementarity, that a case will not be admissible before the ICC if a national
court system is willing and able to hear it); see generally Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The
Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal
Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869 (2002) (addressing the application of complementarity
in various legal contexts including within the ICC and the U.N. Security Council).
194 See generally Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Effective Implementation of
Intersecting Public International Regimes: Environment, Development and Trade Law, in
PUBLIC INTEREST RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION 213 (Teruo Komori & Karel Wellens eds., 2009) (noting how
“mutually supportive” legal regimes can increase effectiveness in environmental
and trade law).
195 See generally Shuichi Furuya, The Principle of Complementarity in Reality:
Who Actually Applies It and in What Way under the ICC System?, in PUBLIC INTEREST
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION, supra note
194, at 293 (discussing how the ICC system complements national jurisdiction and
noting some of the system’s failures).
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Hybrid approaches are not always appropriate and the benefits of
adjudication or mediation as distinct processes remain.
Developing understanding about the use and impact of the hybrid
approaches identified in this Part remains the task of future
scholarship.
5.

WHY INTEGRATION MATTERS IN RETHINKING THE
ARCHITECTURE OF IDR

This Article has argued that there are three core challenges to
the rationale behind the existing architecture of the IDR system.
The justification for prioritizing state-centric adjudication practices
and forums is challenged by the fact that conflicts posing a threat
to international peace and security increasingly involve non-state
actors and extra-legal issues. The failure to develop mediation
capacity at the international level is in tension with states’
preference for it among IDR options. The IDR system is structured
in a manner that fosters process and institutional fragmentation
and fails to incorporate hybrid approaches into the framework. In
response, this Part argues that the IDR system should be
restructured to promote the integration of IDR methods and
institutions in order to increase capacity, mitigate fragmentation,
and conform to the broader paradigm shift that is taking place in
this field.
5.1. Addressing Multiplicity and Fragmentation
This Article has identified the multiplicity of IDR methods and
institutions including new approaches that go beyond the use of a
single method. However, these forms have yet to be organized
into a coherent and functional structure that clarifies the relational
web between them. This level of knowledge is necessary in order
to understand why approaches succeed or fail. For example, there
is no framework for understanding why, in the Laguna del Desierto
Dispute (Argentina v. Chile), the ICJ’s opinion led to a negotiated
settlement196 but in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute
(Honduras v. El Salvador), referral of the dispute to the ICJ
temporarily led to the escalation of tensions while the case was

See GUO, supra note 112, at 14–16 (noting that an ICJ decision facilitated
settlement of the Laguna del Desierto Dispute).
196
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pending.197 Absent some form of coordination, the relationships
between IDR methods will remain ill defined and ambiguous,
making it difficult to incorporate complex IDR approaches into the
international legal framework.198
The lack of an adequate framework results in institutional
fragmentation in IDR. Fragmentation in international law has been
considered as a substantive problem199 as well as an institutional
one.200 One critique that this Article makes is that the use of
mediation, multiple methods, and mixed methods is largely ad hoc
and may be occurring in a way that is contributing to a fragmented
system. Absent comprehensive research about the IDR system,
there is currently no way to systematically track IDR use across
methods and institutions in order to determine if fragmentation is
a real problem.
In order for a system to be coherent and functional, its
substructures need to be organized and coordinated.201 For IDR,
this means developing a framework that comprehensively
identifies methods, their strengths and limits, as well as the
institutions that provide them. It also requires a structure that
allows for integration to occur between methods and
institutions.202

197 See id. at 16 (citing M. Orozco, Boundary Disputes in Central America: Past
Trends and Present Developments, 14 PENSAMIENTO PROPIO 99 (2001)) (noting that the
ICJ judgment “raised the stakes . . . of the bilateral dispute” and strained bilateral
relations “while the definitive delimitation on the ground was still pending”).
198 See generally Bilder, supra note 27, at 10–11 (exploring the complexities of
IDR by posing various questions that may arise in an international dispute).
199 See ILC Report, supra note 128, para. 487 (discussing the lack of
substantive international law and arguing that international law should be
structured to better harmonize the coordination and organization of varying
autonomous international legal rules and institutions).
200 See generally sources cited supra note 129 (discussing, among other topics,
institutional fragmentation in international law).
201 See Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article
31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 279, 285 (2005) (discussing
potential difficulties that may result from a fragmented international system
where various obligations often conflict with one another). See generally Joost
Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of InterConnected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 903 (2004) (arguing for recognition of the
overlap between fragmented bodies of international law and promotion of a more
unified system where individual international legal bodies take account of the
laws and precedents of other international legal bodies).
202 See Ulfstein, supra note 124, at 67–71 (discussing the benefits and
limitations of an integrated institutional framework).
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This concept—developing integrated frameworks—has been
presented as a solution to the problem of fragmentation in
international law.203 ICJ Judge Rosalyn Higgins proposes the idea
of integration through information sharing—a preferable
alternative to pluralistic legal approaches204—as a solution for
fragmentation in international courts.205 Other scholars share
similar ideas. Zaring has identified how the interlinkage of
international institutions, in order to understand the entire system
in addition to its parts, increases the effectiveness of international
governance.206 Berman argues that there is a need to embrace
multiple ways to mediate conflicts, reconcile competing norms and
allow hybrid forms because this provides a more accurate
description of the world and potentially provides useful alternative
approaches.207
The literature on Dispute Systems Design
(“DSD”)208 suggests that integrated approaches informed by an

203 See Higgins, supra note 66, at 15–20 (suggesting that the ICJ can help
prompt integration between judicial and other dispute resolution forums across
regions and cultures but should not aim to replace them as a supranational body).
204 For prominent literature on global legalism and related topics, see
HENKIN, supra note 55 for a discussion of how international law and global
legalism affect the behavior of nations. See also ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF
GLOBAL LEGALISM 71–79 (2009) (positing that global legalism is a faith—a belief
that states follow international law as a matter of practice—but not in theory);
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2623 (1997) (describing the view of “international law as a set of rules
promulgated by a pluralistic community of states”); David Zaring, International
Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 503 (2010) (suggesting that
cohesiveness between international institutions can broaden the scope with which
to view problems, thus making international governance more effective).
205 See HIGGINS, supra note 3 (making the case for legal integration of
international judicial bodies but not addressing mediation or other non-judicial
dispute resolution methods, and arguing against global legal pluralism due to the
practical lack of capacity to achieve it and its effect on discouraging diverse legal
practices).
206 See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 204, at 502–04 (stating that international
institutions such as the WTO might—through the procedural tool of
interlinkage—foster greater confidence in the effectiveness of the international
system).
207 E.g., Paul S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1155–
56 (2007) (introducing the idea that countries should embrace multiple ways of
resolving conflict because of the insights the various actors can provide).
208 DSD is a framework for the selection of dispute resolution methods that
fosters systematic dispute resolution practices in the context of a larger conflict
organization or system. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Roots and Inspirations: A Brief
History of the Foundations of Dispute Resolution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 13, 23 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (explaining
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assessment of the situation and an evaluation of the effectiveness
of proposed methods lead to better outcomes.209 The use of DSD
approaches has been considered in the context of resolving
international investment disputes,210 and dispute resolution by the
United Nations211 and shows that they can increase effectiveness,
efficiency and legitimacy.212 These examples suggest a sensible
rationale for considering an integrated approach for the
architecture of the IDR system.
5.2. Paradigm Shift
Shifts in the practice and discipline of conflict resolution
suggest that there is a trend toward integrated approaches. After
World War II and during the Cold War, efforts to address conflict
followed a management approach where states tried to stabilize
DSD as a new field which aids parties to create tailored dispute processes,
especially for complex of repetitive disputes).
209 See CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 96–116 (1996) (emphasizing the importance of
organizational assessment in designing effective conflict management systems);
WILLIAM URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE
COSTS OF CONFLICT 41–64 (1988) (exploring how to efficiently design dispute
resolution systems); see also Chris Carlson, Convening, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK 169–97 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (detailing the steps
entailed in a successful convening process); SCHEINMAN INST. ON CONFLICT
RESOLUTION, DESIGNING INTEGRATED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: GUIDELINES
FOR PRACTITIONERS AND DECISIONMAKERS IN ORGANIZATIONS (2001) (exploring the
evolution of dispute resolution and the increased emphasis on creating integrated
conflict management systems); Lawrence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer,
Conducting a Conflict Assessment, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 99, 99–
136 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (describing the role conflict assessment
plays in DSD).
210 See Franck, supra note 54, at 180–81 (arguing that there is a need for the
systematic treatment of dispute resolution methods that extends beyond the
existing literature on the ad hoc use of nonbinding IDR methods (mediation and
conciliation) and considering how it might beneficially inform the field of
international investment dispute resolution).
211 See Kenneth Cloke, Conflict Resolution Systems Design, the United Nations
and the New World Order, 8 MEDIATION Q. 343, 344–45 (1991) (suggesting the
beneficial application of DSD in United Nations’ dispute resolution).
212 See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Public and Private International Dispute
Resolution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 438, 450–51 (Michael L.
Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (discussing cross-fertilization between the
international and domestic dispute resolution disciplines); see also Amy J. Cohen,
Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 51, 75–76 (2009) (arguing that there is a need to analyze dispute resolution
processes alongside legal frameworks in order to understand how one influences
the other).
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conflicts in order to mitigate loss of life while still pursuing their
geopolitical aims.213 Peace was defined as the absence of violence.
Between 1990 and 2007, 48% of all conflicts occurred in states
where a conflict had ended no more than five years prior,214 and
since 2000, there have been a high number of recurrent conflicts.215
In response to the increase in recurrence, a new paradigm for
understanding how to end conflict has emerged.216 IDR methods
have shifted from state-centric, power-based approaches aimed at
managing conflict, toward interest-based approaches that promote
resolution between non-state actors through reconciliation and
other means.217 Efforts to achieve security occur through a mix of
conflict resolution practices that build a positive peace.218 The
dominance of state-driven IDR has given way to the rise of intergovernmental and regional organizations in the last twenty years.
Regional and local groups have the ability to act as first-responders
and often add value due to their cultural intelligence of local

213 See BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 1–8 (discussing the approaches
to conflict resolution that evolved after World War II).
214 E.g., Lawrence Woocher, Preventing Violent Conflict: Assessing Progress,
Meeting Challenges, 231 U.S. INST. OF PEACE SPECIAL REP. 5–6 n.21 (2009) (presenting
the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset); see also Harbom et al., supra note 63, at
622 (noting that between 1989–2005, 144 peace agreements were made in 46 of the
121 armed conflicts: 43 were full agreements, 79 were partial agreements, and 22
were agreements to start a peace process).
215 Hewitt, supra note 62, at 27–33 (defining the term ‘conflict’, in the context
of the data tracked, to include inter, intra and non-state conflict resulting in a
minimum of 1000 battle-related deaths, which may reflect lower recurrence rates
for lower-level conflicts and does not reflect levels of new low-level conflict; and
identifying 31 recurrent conflicts in Sri Lanka, Azerbaijan, India, Chad, Iran and
two in Myanmar).
216 The disorganization of existing IDR efforts has been criticized as reducing
the effectiveness of the international community’s peace-building capacity. See
Charles T. Call & Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Wars and Building Peace:
International Responses to War-Torn Societies, 9 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 1, 10–15 (2008)
(examining shortcomings in current IDR, how these shortcomings affect peacebuilding efforts, and what is needed to help overcome these shortcomings).
217 E.g., BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 2, at 8–16 (arguing that new
methods of conflict resolution are more effective and comprehensive because they
seek to resolve underlying conflicts, rather than solely end violence).
218 See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR (Paul C. Stern & Daniel Druckman, eds., 2000)
(containing articles covering a wide range of topics related to new methods in
IDR).
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contexts.219 The participation of inter-governmental and regional
organizations has also promoted democratization of IDR and the
inclusion of civil society participation and non-state governance.
The United Nations, for instance, has provided non-state entities
increased access to international lawmaking.220
This paradigm shift has developed a vision of IDR that
promotes non-state actor participation, considers a broad scope of
issues, integrates methods and institutions and enhances its
capacity to resolve conflict in a variety of international contexts.221
An integrated system “embod[ies] the authentic meaning of justice:
to attain peace through effective dispute resolution.”222 However,
as Part 6 will explore, these changes pose important implications
for the international legal system.
6.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW

This Article has identified ways in which international law has
influenced IDR. IDR has also developed, as a substructure of
international law, in ways that affect the superstructure of the
international legal system.223 As this Article suggests, reforming
IDR challenges international law to become a more open and
integrated system.
Embracing mediation and reducing the
primacy of adjudication removes some authority from states as it
promotes non-state actor participation in IDR processes. An
integrated IDR structure creates a decentralized substructure
within the international legal system. This Part considers such
implications by evaluating how the international legal system’s
state-centric foundations and scope are in tension with the
evolving nature of international conflict and approaches to
resolving it.
219 See Frazier & Dixon, supra note 16, at 390 (outlining two factors that
contribute to the increased participation of regional organizations in dispute
resolution).
220 See ALVAREZ, supra note 188, at 154–56 (discussing the ways in which the
U.N. has provided increased access to non-state entities).
221 See Anne Peters, Dual Democracy, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 263, 296–313, 333 (Jan Klabbers et al. eds., 2009) (discussing
these principles in the context of a global participatory democracy); see also
RAFAEL DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW 181–85 (2010) (making the case for the
need to democratize decision-making in global law).
222 DOMINGO, supra note 221, at 112.
223 See CRAWFORD, supra note 5, at 18 (exploring the effects of the
superstructure of international law on its foundation).
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6.1. Foundations
The foundations of the international legal system emerged
from a 17th century conceptual framework of an international
network of sovereign states that governed their subjects.224
International law was constructed around the principles of state
territorial sovereignty and state consent225 and has primarily
served to regulate the mutual behavior of states.226 With the rise of
the territorial state, international law developed under a classic
regime of sovereignty in which the state held authority over all
other subjects and objects in a given territory. Non-state actors
were the objects of a state, based on territorial or other forms of
control.227 These actors had no standing under international law to
contest the actions of states; they had to—and often did—resort to
violence to establish “effective control” over the area or territory if
they wanted to make a case for international recognition.228
While the focus on states in the realm of dispute resolution
once made sense, given the rationale that resolving inter-state
224 See, e.g., David Held, The Changing Structure of International Law:
Sovereignty Transformed?, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 162, 162–64 (David Held & Anthony
McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2003) (describing the “classic regime of sovereignty” that
arose in the seventeenth century).
225 See generally James Crawford & Susan Marks, The Global Democracy Deficit:
An Essay in International Law and its Limits, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN OPEN
SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 5, at 137–38 (noting that territorial sovereignty
and state consent had become defining pillars of international law by the early
nineteenth century).
226 See, e.g., DOMINGO, supra note 221, at 57–58 (emphasizing that international
law primarily governs state actors rather than individuals because states have
“plenary legal capacity”).
227 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 65–67
(7th ed. 2008) (explaining that because corporations do not have international
legal personality, an agreement between a state and a foreign corporation is not
necessarily subject to the law of treaties; however, states may agree to grant
certain entities like corporations legal status so that they can be governed by that
state’s national law).
228 E.g., David Held, The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty
Transformed?, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
GLOBALIZATION DEBATE, supra note 224, at 162–63 (explaining that some actors
attempted to assert territorial control through violence in order to obtain
sovereign recognition within the global political community); see also Thomas
Baldwin, The Territorial State, in JURISPRUDENCE: CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 207, 224–25
(Hyman Gross & Ross Harrison eds., 1992) (explaining that because the current
international legal system does not provide opportunities for communities to
“secede from existing political arrangements[,]” communities rely upon violence
to assert control over territories).
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disputes would prevent nations from employing their armies and
thus aid in the reduction of war, this paradigm no longer holds
true. In its 1949 Reparations Opinion, the ICJ treated the U.N. as an
international person with the capacity to bring international
claims.229 This marked an early expansion of subjecthood beyond
states to international organizations.230 Such expansion must go
further because threats to global peace and security are
increasingly taking place within, not between, states. If state
dominance in IDR prevails, it will restrict the capacity of the
system.231 Opening up the IDR system is necessary to advance its
capacity for dispute resolution. Effective dispute resolution
requires the participation of key stakeholders, regardless of legal
status under international law. It also requires appreciating and
addressing the interplay between legal and extra-legal aspects of a
dispute. However, the opening of the system needs to occur in a
way that will integrate, not divide, the distinct parts of the
system.232
Despite the evolution of IDR, the foundations of international
law remain state-centric.233 This is evident in the ways that the IDR
system promotes the supremacy of the state and limits non-state
actor participation. Adjudication is designed around rules created
by states and participation controlled by states. Non-judicial forms
of IDR that are open to more parties have been underdeveloped. If
resolving disputes remains the business of states and the system
itself remains closed, the tension between an evolving IDR system

See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178, 187 (Apr. 11) (holding that there can be
types of international legal personality beyond statehood).
230 See CRAWFORD, supra note 5, at 20–21 (noting that in the wake of the ICJ’s
1949 Reparations Opinion, several non-state international organizations have since
been recognized as actors who may participate in international dispute
resolution).
231 See DOMINGO, supra note 221, at 110–11 (arguing that the structure of the
modern state and the state’s dominant role in international affairs constrains
resolution of legal disputes in a global context).
232 See, e.g., ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 26–28 (2009) (discussing how international law has diverged
into public and private realms, with the latter affording non-state actors more
access and authority).
233 See
generally STEPHEN BELL & ANDREW HINDMOOR, RETHINKING
GOVERNANCE: THE CENTRALITY OF THE STATE IN MODERN SOCIETY (2009) (discussing
the origins and purpose of state-centricity in governance within international
law).
229
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6.2. Scope
There is also fundamental tension about scope or who
international law ought to serve.234 This tension manifests itself
when the priorities of the state clash with those of the public. 235 It
is also evident in instances where international law limits powerful
states in the protection of collective interests.236 One important
shift in scope has been the conceptualization of an international
community that goes beyond an identity based solely on the
collection of states, to include a broader collection of stakeholders
joined by shared interests. This concept of collectivity and its place
in international law is not new. Crawford described it as having a
“responsibility to the international community as a whole.”237
See Teruo Komori, Introduction to PUBLIC INTEREST RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 1, 1 (Teruo Komori & Karel Wellens
eds., 2009) (discussing how general international rules were not created to protect
the general interests of a global human community and why this is changing with
regard to international environmental protection, humanitarian law, law of the
sea and space, and other areas of international law).
235 See generally Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (explaining how
international law can be used as a forum to form mutual agreements among selfinterested actors).
236 See Jose E. Alvarez, Contemporary International Law: An ‘Empire of Law’ or
the ‘Law of Empire’?, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 811, 836 (2009) (describing the shift in
international law from a system based on the co-existence of nations to one based
on a new “empire,” defined as a collective order that exists beyond statehood);
Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, The Role of International Forums in the Advancement
of Sustainable Development, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4 (2009) (discussing
how international forums can advance sustainable development and counter the
problems posed by competing national and international interests). But see
PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF
GLOBAL RULES (2005) (analyzing recent events in international law and discussing
some of the circumstances in which certain states rebel against international
agreements often for domestic collective interests that conflict with the
international rules); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Some Reflections on Contemporary
International Law and the Appeal to Universal Values: A Response to Martti
Koskenniemi, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 131 (2005) (noting that national interests often
trump longer term international objectives because powerful nations maneuver
against majority aims, as demonstrated by the tensions between U.S. unilateralism
and EU multilateralism, particularly pertaining to matters of terrorism during the
past decade).
237 JAMES CRAWFORD, Responsibility to the International Community as a Whole, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN OPEN SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 5, at 341.
234
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Supported by a guiding principle of solidarity, the concept has
origins in Christian and natural law.238 From universal norms to
shared obligations, this idea recognizes that for certain matters,
and in certain instances, international law ought to prioritize
collective rights, interests, and needs.239 The establishment of the
International Criminal Court and efforts to protect global
environmental resources offer two powerful examples of areas
where collectivity is a guiding principle. IDR offers a third.
Like most international rules and institutions, the IDR system
was built by states through international agreements. To protect
their authority, nations are reluctant to create and enter into
regimes that require them to submit to higher forms of authority
against their consent. As a result, state participation in IDR is
subject to some form of consent, whether explicit or implied. This
is true for both mediation, which is voluntary (although sometimes
coerced) and adjudication, which requires state consent through
express agreement or implied means. Thus, state participation in
an IDR process necessarily requires some willingness on the state’s
part to defer to an outside authority and to be confined by such.
This requirement makes states cautious about pursuing
adjudication to address their most serious conflicts.240 Legitimacy
and representation problems at the ICJ and the PCA further
contribute to this tendency.241
It is difficult for the IDR system to protect collective interests
when they are not aligned with or are contrary to those of states.
Furthermore, it is unclear if states can or should define what the
interests of the public are. A system that requires state consent
does not allow for the protection of a collective public stakeholder
because the interests of disagreeing states will prevail. This is at
tension with the core purpose of having an IDR system that

238 For a historical and definitional background on the concept of solidarity in
international law, see Rudiger Wolfrum, Solidarity Amongst States: An Emerging
Structural Principle of International Law, 49 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 8 (2009).
239 See generally DELMAS-MARTY, supra note 47 (arguing for a more integrated
system of international law that would provide order to the rights and interests
involved without excluding them).
240 See id. at 34–35 (describing a nation as regressive when it closes itself off
from international community).
241 See G. Shinkaretskaya, supra note 69, at 89 (explaining that because “the
decisions of international adjudication bodies can have no other significance than
that provided by Statute documents,” the international adjudicatory bodies exist
in an odd framework vis-à-vis the state and concerned parties).
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protects the common interests of all nations by replacing the
“recourse to self-help by individual states by a collective response
system.”242 Translating this founding philosophy into other areas
of collective concern, such as global peace and security, presents
significant challenges and raises important questions about how to
prioritize conflicts of interest between states and the collective
global community.
The state-centric model frustrates the ability to include the
broader international public or non-state stakeholders in a conflict
resolution or problem-solving process in a way that does not
demand their inferior status. States are the primary subjects of
international law based on their superior legal status.243 Yet, full
participation is paramount to the success of IDR and sustaining
agreements that maintain peaceful conditions over the long term.244
Society-centered approaches that involve the international
community as a whole in promoting the collective interests of
global peace and security are established through largely
egalitarian governance networks.245 For IDR, this necessarily
requires embracing a paradigm shift away from the state-centric
model, and, perhaps, accepting a system that treats the individual
as the ultimate subject of authority in international law.246
However, translating these preferences from IDR to international
law as a whole requires a balanced approach, since both state and
collective interests are valued in the international order.
7.

CONCLUSION

Global changes are prompting reforms in international law
and, as this Article has shown, in our approaches to resolving

Wolfrum, supra note 238, at 13.
See DOMINGO, supra note 221, at 58 (arguing that states are the primary
subjects of international law, and that individuals are subordinate to states within
this framework).
244 See id. at 181–85 (arguing that global law should be grounded upon a
horizontal democratic structure that fosters broad participation amongst diverse
types of actors, rather than domination by a select cohort of powerful state actors).
245 See generally BELL & HINDMOOR, supra note 233, at 3 (stating that societycentered approaches involve “a wider range of actors within governing processes
. . . held together . . . by informal and relatively egalitarian networks”).
246 See generally Samantha Besson, The Authority of International Law—Lifting
the State Veil, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 343 (2009) (arguing that international law should
understand individuals, not states, as the central actors and as the basis of the
law’s authority and legitimacy).
242
243
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international disputes. The data on international conflict suggests
that intra-state wars are the primary emerging threat to global
peace and security. Ethnic wars, identity conflict, terrorism, and
non-state wars extend beyond the traditional inter-state paradigm.
As these types of conflict emerge, they call into question whether
the international legal system, largely created by states for states,
has the capacity to address international conflict in the modern era.
This Article has argued that there are three fundamental
limitations of the IDR system. As long as the IDR system operates
in a silo manner that focuses primarily on adjudication, it will be
limited in its capacity and effectiveness. International adjudication
forums need to find new ways to open their doors to non-state
stakeholders.
Mediation at the international level requires
additional institutionalization and support. International legal
scholars need to enhance understanding about the use of multiple
methods and mixed methods, and when and why they provide
valuable contributions to the IDR system. Finally, the architecture
of the IDR system would benefit from a framework that promotes
the integration of methods and institutions in order to increase
capacity and effectiveness.
The proliferation and evolution of IDR demands rethinking its
traditional structure and recognizing where it is dependent on and
independent from international law. Conceptualizing IDR as an
integrated system requires increasing the participation of non-state
actors and considering how extra-legal issues should be resolved
alongside legal ones. It also recognizes the complexity of IDR as a
substructure of the international legal system that branches into
political, social, and cultural realms. In these ways, IDR has the
potential to influence the foundations of international law in small,
but profound, ways.
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